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The purpose of this thesis is to determine if there are
contracting techniques that can be
.
employed to reduce
procurennent administrative leadtime (PALT) for the procurement
of spare parts at the Navy Aviation Supply Office (ASO) . Findings
were that implementation of the initiatives in the Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 and Section 908 of the FY87 DOD
Authorization Act has resulted in increased PALT. Reasons for this
increase in PALT include the establishment of a Competition
Advocate; processing of justifications and authorizations (J&As)
;
increased synopsis time in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) ; a
reduced threshold for contractors' certified cost or pricing data;
and nnissed requirement dates due to prospective pricing of BOA
orders. The nnajor conclusion is that ASO is using the appropriate
contracting techniques for spares procurement. A spirited
application of those techniques to streannline the procurement
process may reduce PALT.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Since the early 1980's, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
undertaken a highly aggressive and successful program aimed at
reducing spare parts prices and increasing competition among
prospective contractors. While the recent initiatives have satisfied
this overall goal, they have had undesirable side effects, among
them growing procurement leadtimes. Perhaps the fastest growing
segment of wholesale (material managed by inventory control
points (iCPs)) procurement leadtimes in recent years is the
administrative processing time required to award a contract for
spare parts. A recent study concluded that procurement
administrative leadtime (PALT) has increased as much as 60% at
some inventory control points and has shown dramatic overall
growth at all procurement activities. According to the study, it
now routinely takes almost nine months of administrative
processing time just to place a spare parts order for wholesale
stock. [Ref 1: p. 1-3]
The period of the early 1980's was marked by a great deal of
turmoil for the DOD spare parts procurement process. The news
media were filled with harsh headlines assailing DOD's shoddy
business practices and inadequate controls over the procurement
process. Headlines focused on "horror" stories describing DOD's
purchase of $100 diodes, $436 hammers, $337 nuts, $640 aircraft
8
toilet seats, $659 aircraft ash trays, and $37 screws. These are
but a few of the more popular and well-publicized examples of
spare parts overpricing that grabbed the public's attention and
started a wave of procurement reform the magnitude of which the
nation had not seen in over 36 years. The spare parts issue is big
and pervasive. DOD has in the past paid exorbitant prices for
spares, and there have been many cases of "apparent" overpricing
on items that are, in fact, reasonably priced. Nonetheless, there is
a general public perception that DOD has historically done a poor
job of managing the procurement of spare parts.
The genesis of recent procurement reform was the publication
of the Carlucci Initiatives in the spring of 1981. The Carlucci
Initiatives, as the first major policy thrust of newly-appointed
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, were designed to
improve overall DOD management and provided the impetus for
subsequent initiatives and legislation. Reacting to the mounting
criticisms of overpricing, waste, mismanagement, and to a certain
extent favoritism in the selection of contractors, government
agencies began to tighten up. Numerous policy directives were
promulgated and Congress launched an intensive pursuit to seek
demonstrably more competition and more stringent restrictions on
the awarding of sole source contracts.
Numerous bills were introduced, and committee hearings were
held, finally coalescing in the passage of three new major laws in
1984: The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), which
overhauled and replaced a good portion of the Armed Services
Procurement Act (ASPA) and Title III of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act (FPASA) which governed procurement
by most civil agencies; the Defense Procurement Reform Act (P.L.
98-525); and the Small Business and Federal Procurement
Competition Enhancement Act (P.L. 98-577), These laws
represented the first overall reform of the procurement statutes in
over 36 years.
As a result of these laws, specifically the Competition in
Contracting Act, the statutory emphasis has now shifted from the
method (emphasis added) of procurement to the use of multiple
sources (emphasis added) . No longer is how you procure the
principal matter of the law; rather it is from whom you procure
that is the foremost concern, While the preference for formal
advertising over the negotiated method of procurement still exists,
the law now emphasizes competitive procurement from among
multiple sources over procurement from single or sole sources.
The renewed emphasis on competitive procurement, the law of the
land, has resulted in substantial dollar savings to the taxpayer.
Competition drives prices down, resulting in more realistic pricing
decisions, fewer cost overruns, and lower program costs.
Despite the well-documented benefits of competition and
notwithstanding the recent major legislation, it is the author's
opinion that PALI has and will continue to increase. Price
analysis and review, breakout, streamlining and other related
initiatives, while well-designed and well-intended, have clearly
increased wholesale administrative leadtimes and resultant
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inventory levels. The DOD system, in attempting to respond to a
multitude of external and internal pressures for improvement in
the procurement process and in the degree of price competition,
has become so cumbersome that leadtime management problems
have been generated.
B. PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEADTIME (PALT)
PALT is referred to as the time interval between the initiation
of a procurement action and the award of a contract. PALT is
one of the two component parts of procurement leadtime (PCLT)
;
forecasting PCLT is a key factor in the inventory managennent
process because it helps deternnine when an order will be placed
and the quantity of material held in inventory. As administrative
leadtimes lengthen, safety level requirements also grow and order
quantities are increased for the heavier processing workload
requirements; the resultant increases can be viewed as costs
associated with the savings derived from the process of
competition. Procurement leadtime consists of:
a. Administrative leadtime (ALT or PALT) - the time from
when the requirements document is generated to the date
when the contract is signed.
b. Production leadtinnc (PLT) - the time fronn the date of
the contract to the date of receipt of the first significant
contract delivery
. [Ref . 2 : p . l]
The acquisition process consists of a series of interrelated steps
that are required to be performed and which, due to their
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complexity and the requirement to meet statutory guidelines, add
significantly to the tinne required to award a contract. The first
key step is development of a comprehensive strategy or plan to fill
the identified need, and includes the determination of the
Government's requirennent and a detailed overall plan to
accomplish the procurement. The next phase consists of developing
the specification for the requirement and includes the preparation
of the purchase request (PR) which contains all of the acquisition
requirennents such as potential sources of supply or sole source
justifications; proposal evaluation and source selection criteria;
contract cost estimates; and the citation of funds to be committed.
Once the PR is received by the contracting officer, the
procurement plan is developed. Receipt of the PR marks the
beginning of PALT. The PR is reviewed for accuracy and content
and a series of actions are performed by the contracting officer's
staff to ensure that a product is obtained that nneets the
requester's needs in a timely nnanner and at a reasonable cost.
The specific activities performed in the procurement planning stage
add significantly to PALT due in large measure to the statutory
requirements that must be adhered to to ensure that the required
material is purchased at a fair and reasonable price in a
competitive environment
.
At the conclusion of a thorough review of the PR and detailed
planning for the procurement, the solicitation document is
prepared and synthesized in the U.S. Department of Commerce
newspaper, the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) for all solicitations
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over $25,000. The CBD synopsis is an important part of the
process because it announces in advance of release of the
solicitation that the Government is looking for qualified suppliers to
fill a particular need. The solicitation document is issued and
reflects all key decisions made in the initial planning stage and
culnninates in the issuance of either an invitation for bicis (IFB) for
sealed bid type procurements or request for proposals (RFP) for
competitive proposal procurements.
Once the vendors' offers are received, the source selection
phase begins. This is the process by which offers from the private
sector are weighed by the Covernnnent against its stated needs,
terms, conditions, and evaluation standards and a contractor is
selected. Some of the key elements in this phase include technical
evaluation of the offers, on-site evaluations and preaward surveys
(to determine the technical and financial capabilities
(responsibility) of the offerors), and price/cost analysis. Under the
sealed bid method of procurement, contractors submit their bids
and a public bid opening is held and the responses recorded. Late
bids and modifications are handled as appropriate and the bids are
reviewed for mistakes and missing information. The responsiveness
of contractors to the IFB is determined, and the low, or most
responsive, bidder is identified. The contract is awarded to the
lowest cost, most responsive bidder. Under the competitive
proposal procurement method, proposals are received from
contractors in response to an RFP. The contracting officer
determines the competitive range and negotiations take place with
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th<2 selected offeror for such things as terms and conditions, price,
and type of contract. The source selection phase is followed by
award of the contract. If the sealed bid method is utilized, the
contract is awarded to the lowest cost, most responsive bidder
while under competitive proposal procurement, the contract is
awarded to the contractor who proposes the, most advantageous
offer, price and other factors considered. It is at this point that
PALT ends; award of the contract to the successful offeror is
synopsized in the CBD and the contract administration phase of the
procurement process commences.
While all of the various phases of the procurement are not tied
to a specific timetable, sufficient time must be allowed to enable
prospective contractors to submit bids and proposals and allow for
the orderly processing of the procurement. The only portion of the
procurement process that has a statutory time requirement is the
CBD synopsis. Under current rules, the solicitation document must
be publicized 15 days in advance of its issuance, and the contract
cannot be awarded less than 30 days after release of the
solicitation document. Most of the procurement-critical decisions
usually occur prior to the start of PALT; since PALT marks the
point of transfer of responsibility for the procurement action from
the requestor to the contracting officer, requirements must be
defined, funding secured, and acquisition planning accomplished
prior to the start of PALT.
PALT is an important consideration in the procurement process
because excessive administrative leadtime inhibits the contracting
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officer's ability to award the contract in a timely manner and
obtain required material for the end user. While CICA has
abandoned the preference for formal advertising and the great deal
of effort required to write formal determinations and findings for
negotiated procurements as well as processing requests for
authority to negotiate through all echelons of the particular
government agency, one would expect that PALT would be
reduced. Instead, CICA has added new administrative impedinnents
and constraints that have resulted in increased PALT. A more
detailed review of the component parts of PALT as well as CICA
and other statutes that have had an effect on PALT will be
presented in Chapters II and IV of this study.
C. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
The primary thrust of this study is to discuss, analyze and
evaluate the spare parts procurement process at the Navy Aviation
Supply Office (ASO) in Philadelphia, PA. Factors internal and
external to the purchasing organization that contribute to the
amount of time necessary to process procurement actions generated
by the Supply Demand Review (SDR) requirements determination
process will be analyzed with a view toward presenting
recommendations that will assist in the overall reduction of PALT
at ASO.
The goal of the research is to provide contracting personnel at
ASO with the tools that will enable them to procure spare parts
more expeditiously than is currently the case, without sacrificing
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the benefits of CICA and other procurement legislation. By having
at their disposal tailored contracting methods/types/vehicles, ASO
will benefit from the resultant reductions in PALT and overall
procurement leadtime for spare parts. The research and
recommendations will in turn have wide implications for the Navy
and DOD's spare parts management improvement efforts.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the objective cited above, the following primary
research question is addressed in this study:
Are there contracting techniques that
can be employed to reduce PALT for spare
parts procurement and if so, what are
they?
In support of the primary research question, the following
subsidiary questions are addressed:
1. What are the essential components of PALT?
2. How have recent DOD initiatives to reduce spare parts
prices and increase competition affected PALT?
3. Do recent DOD initiatives relative to spare parts
procurement adequately address PALT?
4. What are the principal contracting techniques currently used
for spare parts procurement?
5. What contracting methods/types/vehicles can be effectively
used to reduce PALT without sacrificing the benefits of
reduced spare parts prices and increased competition?
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E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary impetus for this research was a study completed
by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) in September 1986.
At the request of the Spares Competition and Logistics Technology
Program Office (PML550) of the Naval Supply Systems Command
(NAVSUP), the researcher used this study as the basis and focal
point for further research.
The information presented in this research effort was obtained
through primary and secondary research. Primary research
consisted of personal interviews of key individuals within the ASO
Purchase, Breakout, BOSS Program Management, Comptroller,
Weapon Management, and Systems Development Divisions. The
structure of the interviews was established from a series of
questions identified during an extensive review of the current
literature. Other types of data utilized in this study were local
documents, reports and activity records that were provided by
ASO personnel.
The secondary research methodology employed was an
extensive review of relevant literature. The review was conducted
to obtain an historical perspective of PALT issues. The literature
utilized was obtained from multiple sources, including the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), the Naval Postgraduate
School library, the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE), the Army Procurement Research Office (APRO), the Air
Force Business Research Management Center (AFBRMC) and the
Air Force Logistics Management Center (AFLMC) . In addition, the
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Institute for Defense Analyses, current Federal and DOD
regulations, supplementary directives, previous PALT studies,
previous theses, and a review of current publications and
periodicals relevant to the field of Federal procurement and
procurement administrative leadtime (PALT) were also utilized.
These useful sources of information are contained in the reference
and bibliography sections of this paper.
The information thus obtained was analyzed, compared and
contrasted in order to obtain a clear picture of the various
institutional forces, effects and considerations relevant to the issues
and problems associated with the management of PALT in the
spare parts procurement process.
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study is limited to studying the procurement process for
aviation spare parts with a dollar value in excess of $25,000. Due
to the complex and technical nature of parts procured by ASO, the
researcher did not study ASO's small purchase ($25,000 or less)
function since it represents a relatively small segment and dollar
value of the overall procurement effort.
The study focuses on the procurement process from the time a
replenishment requirement is identified and initiated by the Supply
Demand Review (SDR) process until a contract is awarded to a
vendor. This study also presents and analyzes the regulatory
changes that have occurred over the last three years and how
these changes have affected the efficiency of the procurement
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process at ASO. In addition, an in-depth review and analysis of
the LMI study on procurement leadtime will be presented with
observations relative to the degree of application or relevance to
the procurement process and PALT at ASO,
G. ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout this study, it is assumed that the reader is familiar
with the Federal Acquisition process and the limitations and
idiosyncrasies associated with it. It is further assumed that the
reader is familiar with basic Naval terminology and with basic
contracting and acquisition terminology. If the reader desires,
detailed information on the procurement process may be obtained
in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Defense
Supplement to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR)
.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized to give the reader a comprehensive
overview of PALT at ASO and the acquisition environnnent that
inhibits the process. Chapter II provides an in-depth review and
description of the procurement process, both fronn a generic sense
and as it pertains to ASO. The review of the procurement process
provides a detailed explanation of the PALT components of the
process.
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Chapter III provides a review of the acquisition environment
and focuses on the two major initiatives (The Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 and Section 908 of the FY87 DOD
Authorization Act concerning undefinitized contractual actions
(UCAs)) that have had the most significant effect on the
procurement process and PALT at ASO in recent years. Chapter
IV presents an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of PALT statistics at
ASO covering the period from October 1984 through March 1987.
Chapter V describes and analyzes the various contract types
and contracting methods available to procurement personnel. The
researcher used a "decision matrix" to weigh the various contract
types and contracting methods against ASO's specific needs and
concerns to arrive at a decision on the most feasible contract types
and methods that can be used by procurement personnel to keep
PALT to a minimum, given the present legislative constraints.
Chapter VI provides conclusions of the research effort and offers
recommendations for methods to reduce PALT and provide for a
more efficient and expeditious procurement process at ASO.
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II. THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the specific steps in the procurement
process that, taken as a whole, define the complexity of the
administrative process and give more meaning to the elements of
PALT. A brief introduction to the process was presented in the
previous chapter; what follows is a chronological description of each
step of the generic procurement process. Following this discussion,
a detailed description of the procurement process at ASO will be
presented
.
B. THE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
1. The Generic Procurement Process
The procurement process, depicted in Figure 1,
encompasses all phases related to the acquisition of supplies and
services for and by the Government. It begins at the point when
agency needs are established and includes the description of
requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of
sources, award of contracts, contract administration, and those
technical and management functions directly related to the process
of fulfilling agency needs by contract. [Ref. 3: Para. 2.101]
In the presolicitation phase, the agency analyzes its
capability to achieve its mission and then determines a need for
21

























Figure 1. The Generic Procurement Process
Source: Developed by researcher
22
products and services. The needs satisfaction analysis phase
consists of the agency deciding whether or not to use existing
material in stock. If the decision is made to procure material,
the agency prepares for filling the identified need by contract in
the most economical, timely, effective, efficient, and equitable
manner. The agency develops a fornnal statement of its need for
products or services and the associated terms and conditions under
which it seeks formal responses from the private sector.
Evaluation and selection is the portion of the solicitation-
award phase in which responses from the private sector are
weighed against stated needs, terms, conditions, and evaluation
standards, and a supplier is selected. The contract award phase
consists of the agency and supplier reaching a "meeting of the
minds" and reflecting their mutual understanding in a written
instrument defining each other's rights and obligations. Post-award
adnninistration involves each of the parties discharging their
obligations under the contract, with oversight, surveillance, and
engagement by the Government as appropriate. Finally, the
completion stage includes the contractor providing the product or
service contracted for as well as Government acceptance of the
goods
.
2. Steps in the Procurement Process
The key steps in the procurement process are detailed
below. While generic in nature, the steps described may not
occur in the exact sequence since the process may differ according
to the agency conducting the procurement; the goods or services
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required; the size, type, and complexity of the procurement; the
economic interests and public concerns in a given transaction; and
the laws and procedures that govern each case,
a. Agency need determination (presolicitation phase)
Agency need determinatipn is the step by which a
comprehensive plan is developed to fill an identified need by
contract in the most economical, timely, effective, and equitable
manner. , Within this step is the determination of the
Government's requirement. A continuous mission analysis is
performed; a formal need statement is prepared; liaison is
established between the program office and the contracting office;
procurement planning is initiated; the program is formulated and
approved; advance cost estimates are prepared; budget
authorization and appropriations are prepared; and the project is
selected and approved. The choices of how to meet the
Government's needs range from procurement of off-the-shelf
commercial items, use of "in-house" or intragovernment resources
to the acquisition of special items from the private sector.
If the decision is made to contract for the required
material, the requirement specification is then developed. A
market survey is performed and the requirement is specified in
terms of a:




commercial item description, or
other purchase description.
After the requirement is described, a list is prepared
delineating the required Federal and Military Specifications and
Standards. Quality and quantity requirements are determined;
delivery and performance requirements are set; and other contract
requirements are specified, such as:




government furnished property and equipment;
spare parts provisioning; and
industrial security.
Next in this step is the preparation of the purchase
request (PR) which contains all of the user's requirements. It
specifically includes a potential source (s) of supply or sole-source
justification; contractor proposal evaluation and source selection
criteria; contract cost estimates; and citation of the funds that are
being committed for the procurement. As part of the overall
acquisition plan, a procurement plan is developed by the
contracting officer and his staff.
More than ever before, thorough and realistic advance
acquisition planning is being stressed in Government procurement.
To succeed in conducting and concluding sound procurements, it is
fundamental and essential to plan for the acquisition of products
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needed by the Government. Planning is perhaps the most
important phase of the procurement cycle because it improves the
likelihood that the contract will achieve its intended objective.
Planning is the process by which the efforts of all personnel
responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated
through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency's needs in a
timely manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing
the overall strategy for managing the acquisition, analyzing
objectives, and setting priorities. The overall mission of every
procurement is to obtain a product or service that meets user
needs in a timely manner at a reasonable cost [Rcf. 3: Para.
7.101]. Elements of the procurement plan consist of the following,
as appropriate:
Review of the procurement request, including feasibility of
specifications, purchase descriptions, or statements of work;
Review of time requirements and sufficiency of funds;
Determination of the availability of sources of supply;
Review and approval of proposal evaluation and source
selection criteria;
Development of a source selection plan;
Determination of competitive procedures (sealed bidding or
competitive proposals)
;
Selection of type of contract;
Assessment of market conditions and availability of qualified
sources;
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Small business and labor surplus area set-aside determina-
tions;
Subcontracting requirements;
Screening for small disadvantaged concerns program
potential;
Requirements for acquisition from Government-established
mandatory sources;
Procurement history of the product or service;
Identification of long lead items;
Determination of the kind of competition (price, technical,
life cycle costing, design-to-cost);
Considerations for increasing competition, such as CBD
synopsis; breakout potential; economic order quantity;
splitting or combining requirements; second sourcing;
commercial/foreign sales potential; and the Government's
market research efforts;
Availability of Government furnished equipment (GFE);
Establishing leadtime standards and milestones for the
procurement;
Justifying and obtaining approval for noncompetitive
procurement;
First article approval requirements;
Assessment of performance risks;
Contract financing alternatives;
Identification of special contract alternatives;
Clearances and approvals to be obtained from higher
authority;
27
Determining the need for deviations from the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or other regulations;
• Assignment of contract administration functions;
Scheduling of completion times for each task; and
Assignment of tasks to specific persons.
b. Solicitation-award phase
The solicitation-award phase is concerned with
structuring a formal statement of the need for the required
material and the associated terms and conditions under which the
Government will seek formal offers from the private sector to fill
that need. The solicitation document reflects all key decisions
made in the initial planning phase. An invitation for bids (IFB) is
used to solicit competitive sealed bids in the sealed bidding nnethod
of contracting while a request for proposals (RFP) is used to solicit
competitive or noncompetitive proposals in contracting by
negotiation. As described in the FAR [Ref. 3: Part 14], the sealed
bidding method of contracting is used when (l) time permits the
solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids; (2) the
award will be made on the basis of price and price-related factors;
(3) it is not necessary to conduct discussions with responding
offerors about their bids; and (4) there is a reasonable
expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid. The elements of
the sealed bidding process are as follows;
Preparation of IFBs that clearly, accurately, and
completely describe the Government's requirements;
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Pui^Uclzlng the IFB through distribution to prospective
bidders, posting in public places, and synopsizing in the
Connmerce Business Daily . This enables prospective bidders
to prepare and submit bids;
• Submission of bids to be opened at the tinne and place
stated in the solicitation for the public opening of bids;
Evaluation of bids without discussions with bidders; and
• Contract award following public opening of bids to the
responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the IFB and is
considered the most advantageous to the Government based
only on price and other price-related factors included in
the solicitation.
In contrast, the FAR [Ref. 3: Part 15] describes
contracting by negotiation as a process that involves the use of
competitive proposals and discussions with offerors. Negotiation is
a procedure that includes the receipt of proposals from offerors,
permits bargaining, and usually affords an opportunity to revise
their offers before award of a contract. Bargaining between the
parties can apply to price, schedule, technical requirements, type
of contract, or other terms of a proposed contract. The essential
evaluation factors of negotiated procurement include:
• The factors that will be considered in evaluating proposals
are tailored to each acquisition and include only those factors
that will have an impact on the source selection decision;
The evaluation factors ihat apply to an acquisition and the
relative importance of those factors are withm the broad
discretion of agency acquisition officials. Price or cost to
the Government are an evaluation factor in every source
selection. Other factors may include cost realism, technical
excellence, management capability, personnel qualifications,
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experience, past performance, schedule, and any other
relevant factors;
• While the lowest price or lowest total cost to the Government
is normally the deciding factor in many source selections, in
certain acquisitions the Government may select the source
whose proposal offers the greatest value to the Government
in terms of performance and other factors;
• The solicitation document clearly states the evaluation
factors, including price or cost and any significant
subfactors, that will be considered in making the source
selection and their relative importance; and
• The solicitation informs offerors of minimum requirements
that apply to particular evaluation factors and significant
subfactors. [Ref. 3: Part 15.605]
The first part of the solicitation-award phase consists of
preparing the solicitation document and synopsizing the require-
ment, and includes such actions as:
• Preparation of a source list;
• IFB or RFP contents as set forth in the FAR, including:
- The Government's requirement in the form of a specifi-
cation, purchase description, or statement of work;
- Mandatory FAR provisions and clauses;
- Special terms and conditions;
- Pertinent labor law requirements,
- Representations and certifications;
- Bond requirements;
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Source evaluation criteria and their relative
importance;
- Delivery or performance requirements;
- Requirements for subcontracting plans;
- Requirements for cost or pricing data;
- Bid samples or first article approval requirements;
Precise date
,
time, and place for submission of bids,
and date and time of public bid opening, in sealed
bidding; and
- Precise date and place for submission of proposals in
procurement by negotiation;
Obtaining required legal, funding, and contract clearance
reviews;
Synopsizing in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD);
Effecting other pre-solicitation publicity;
Including any special instructions to offerors;
Mailing the solicitation;
Public posting of the solicitation; and
Resolving any protests from contractors that may arise.
Under the sealed bidding method, the source evaluation
stage of the process involves the opening of bids at the precise time
and place specified in the IFB. The bids are recorded and an
abstract of the offers is prepared. Minor informalities or
irregularities are corrected and offerors are permitted to correct
any apparent clerical mistakes as necessary. Finally, the con-
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tracting officer makes a determination that prospective contractors
are responsible and that the prices offered are reasonable before
awarding the contract.
In negotiated procurement, source selection procedures are
designed to (l) maximize competition; (2) minimize the
complexity of the solicitation, evaluation, and the selection
decision; (3) ensure impartial and comprehensive evaluation of
offerors' proposals; and (4) ensure selection of the source whose
proposal has the highest degree of realism and whose performance
is expected to best meet stated Government requirements. The
elements of source selection in negotiated procurement include:
• Determining the competitive range by evaluating each
proposal in light of all elements specified in the solicitation,
including cost and price, evaluation criteria, statement of
work, and specifications;
Evaluation of offerors' proposals, considering such factors as
cost or price, cost realism, technical excellence, management
capability, personnel qualifications, experience, past perform-
ance, schedule, and any other relevant factors;
• Notification of offerors not found within the competitive
range; and
Preparation of the negotiation strategy.
The source selection stage of the process consists of
weighing offers from the private sector against stated needs,
terms, conditions, and evaluation standards and a contractor is
selected. In the sealed bidding method, the contract is awarded
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to that responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the IFB, will
be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price
and the price-related factors included in the solicitation. Under
negotiated procurement, the contracting officer determines which
proposals are in the competitive range for the purpose of
conducting written or oral discussions; the competitive range is
determined on the basis of cost or price and other factors that
were stated in the solicitation and includes all proposals that have
a reasonable chance of being selected for contract award. At the
conclusion of discussions with the offerors, the contracting officer
issues a request for best and final offers (BAFO) . The contracting
officer awards the contract after taking into account the various
source selection criteria and the recommendations nnade by the
source selection authority.
c. Post-award administration phase
Post-award administration is the final phase of the
procurennent process; its primary objective is to see that the user
(the Government) gets the necessary requirement filled within the
time limits specified in the contract at a fair and reasonable price
as well as ensuring the contractor's compliance with the terms and
conditions of the contract. Typical activities conducted during this
phase include production and performance surveillance, cost
monitoring, quality assurance and inspection, product acceptance,
contract disputes, contract terminations, and payment for work
performed and material delivered by the contractor. Post-award
administration is a critical phase in the acquisition process to the
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extent that many of the allegations of waste, excessive costs, and
mismanagement point to shoddy contract administration practices.
C. THE ASO PROCUREMENT PROCESS
ASO uses the Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP)
replenishment model to trigger the start of the procurement
process, which is conceptually depicted in Figure 2. The UICP
model takes into consideration many variables in determining the
reorder quantity and reorder point. The reorder quantity refers to
how much to order while the reorder point refers to when to
order. The variables include, but are not limited to, the mean
administrative leadtime (ALT), mean production leadtime (PLT),
mean quarterly demand, associated variances, item costs, holding
costs, and administrative ordering costs. Funding is made
available through the use of the Navy Stock Fund (NSF) which is
based on a pool of funds that is recycled and never expires.
Funding is a limiting factor and since ASO, like other DOD
activities, is sometimes faced with inadequate or unstable funding
levels, the model is adjusted accordingly. These variables are
input into a program referred to as Supply Demand Review (SDR)
which is run periodically to trigger the initiation of the
procurement process. The SDR process makes a buy
recommendation for material shortages that are expected to
occurleadtime away. The SDR recommendation takes 5-10 days
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Figure 2. The ASO Procurement Process
Source: ASO Systems Development Branch
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The SDR recommendation is forwarded to the item manager
(IM) who reviews the requirement and makes a recommendation
whether to buy the material or not. Often the IM has
information available from the fleet or other sources about
expected fluctuations in demand patterns and has a good feel for
changes in normal demand for the commodities he/she manages.
The IM carefully reviews the requirennent and recommends
adjustments to the Master Data File (MDF) as appropriate. The
IM then forwards his recommendation to the equipment specialist
(ES) who, through technical expertise and in-depth knowledge
about the commodity in question, certifies the technical aspects of
the requirement. ASO's requirements review board (RRB) then
validates the recommendation of the IM and ES and makes
appropriate adjustments to the computer model. The RRB can be
viewed as a quality control monitor during this stage of the
process. The IM review phase can take from 2-28 days,
depending on the complexity of the material in question.
Once the decision is made to purchase material (in response to
the SDR recommendation), the automated procurement (FOl) and
accrual accounting (G03) programs are run. This procedure in
effect creates what is commonly referred to as the "FOl buy
package", which is a folder containing all of the needed information
(procurement worksheet (NAVSUP Form 1275), procurennent
history, production schedule, etc.) to effect the purchase of the
material. With the implementation of a local internal
procurement tracking system at ASO in November 1985, the FOl
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package contains a computer-generated bar code which is used
within the Purchase Branch (PG) to track each folder through the
various stages of the buying effort. The internal tracking system
is called Work In Process (WIP) and is an integrated data base
that provides a daily update of the Docunnent Status File (DSF)
.
The WIP permits the orderly tracking and accumulation of PALT
within PG and provides management tools in the form of reports
and lists that identify procurements assigned to each buyer,
whether the buy is competitive or not, the dollar value of the
procurement, age of the requirement, and other management
information. The WIP is used by management to monitor contract
close-out and other internal activities from start to finish. The
WIP system is being expanded to include all departments,
divisions, and sections involved in the procurement process; while
not fully implemented at the present time, after installation and
initial training of personnel the entire procurement process will be
monitored by the WIP.
The PALT clock starts ticking at ASO at the point when the
SDR response is certified by the RRB and the response is manually
input into the computer to produce the FOl, The SDR response
phase takes from 3-10 days to complete. It would seem that the
SDR recommendation and IM review phases should be included in
the PALT computation. An average of 7-38 days is represented in
these stages, but since technically speaking a firm requirement has
not been identified and certified, this block of time is considered
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"dead time" because the IM, ES and RRB are in the process of
validating the computer-generated requirement.
The next phase of the process is source certification by the
IM/ES team. Included in this phase are administrative functions
performed by the Weapon Managennent Branch (WM) clerks and
includes logging the FOl on the WIP system and sorting and
assigning the FOl folders to the appropriate ES. The ES is the
technical expert whose primary responsibility is to perform a
technical review of the item which includes: reviewing the item's
procurement and price history; looking for technical disconnects in
the package and correcting them as required; exploring alternate
sources; and reviewing technical drawings obtained from the Naval
Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) or other sources (including
vendors) . The ES obtains technical drawings by means of a
DD1149 (Order For Supplies And Services) from NATSF and
performs a limited screen of the item. This screen is a detailed
look at the technical aspects of non-complex items such as
airframe components like brackets or electronic circuit cards
consisting of a limited number of piece parts. The ES limits his
technical review to the top level drawing. More complex items
like circuit boards and other sophisticated items are subjected to a
more thorough and complete technical review along with a full
breakout screen by the Competition Advocate (CA) breakout
division. The breakout process attempts to break out the itenn to
competition vice relying on prime vendors to supply the material
obtained from sub-vendors when they add no intrinsic value to
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the item. The breakout division's responsibility includes a review
of the top level drawings provided by the ES as well as ordering
additional drawings for the additional tiers of a complex item from
NATSF. In the course of the ES's technical review, the status of
completed or pending breakouts is obtained from the breakout
division to simplify the process and increase the accuracy of the
source determination decision. It should be pointed out that every
requirement reviewed by the ES requires a new drawing from
NATSF to ensure that the latest equipment configuration changes
are reflected in the technical and breakout screening process.
The ES also prepares a source certification procurennent record
(SCPR), completes the required competition advocate (CA) form,
and also prepares a justification and authorization (J & A) for sole
source procurennents as required. In addition, the ES indicates
required first article or first production lot testing requirements on
the DD1149 for use by the buyer in selecting appropriate contract
clauses. The connpleted fornns are forwarded to the IM who
completes the CA form by adding a fleet impact statement. The
WM clerks key all of this information into the WIP systenn and
forward the forms to the Connpetition Advocate Directorate for a
breakout screen as required.
With the passage of CICA in April 1984, ASO is required, as
are many DOD activities, to increase the level of competitive
procurements. This requirement has led to the creation of the
Competition Advocate (CA) Directorate whose primary purpose is to
promote and assure the maximum use of competition.
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Competition at ASO is closely tied with the Navy's Buy Our Spares
Smart (BOSS) program, specifications streamlining and spares
breakout. The CA staff receives the required forms from the
IM/ES and enters the information into the CA computer. The
forms are then forwarded to the breakout division where technical
information and ES certifications are reviewed, The Competition
Advocate certifies sole source, non-competitive buys recommended
by the ES after a review of the item is conducted and reveals that
it cannot be broken out to competition. Once the appropriate
forms are certified and signed by the breakout division, they are
forwarded to the Competition Advocate for signature and returned
to the IM. The IM consolidates the SCPR, CA, and J & A forms
and forwards the FOl package to the Material Accounting Division
(ma) . The MA phase of the process involves a certification that
funds to effect the procurement are available and thus reserved
for the particular buy. This phase takes 1-3 days to complete.
The FOl package can, and often does, bounce back and forth
between the IM/ES team and CA; this is shown by the double
arrows in this segment of the process in figure 2. This apparent
inefficiency is inherent in the process and is necessary to ensure
that CA and the IM/ ES team are in agreement over the approved
source (s) of supply. The average time it takes to cycle the FOl
package through the ES/IM and CA phases is 10-100 days. To
minimize any duplication of effort between IM/ES team and CA,
the master computer contains information relative to breakout of
the item. If an item is coded as not having been broken out for
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competition, the FOl package is flagged for "CA interest". This
alerts the ES to the fact that the breakout division will perform a
full breakout screen and order the remaining drawings. In these
instances the ES need only perform a limited screen of the item
and thus save time and duplication of effort.
The next phase in the process consists of a review by ASO's
Small Business Representative (SB) whose purpose it is to review
PRs to ensure that maximum opportunity for participation in
procurements is afforded to small business and small disadvantaged
(8(a)) business concerns, labor surplus areas, and the severely
handicapped. All PRs except base support requirements and sole
source PRs less than $5,000 are reviewed by SB. The SB interface
takes 2-5 days to complete.
The FOl package enters the Purchase or PG phase and accounts
for the vast majority of PALT. The FOl is received by the
Procurement Support Branch (PSP) who assigns the procurement
to a buyer. The buyer reviews the FOl and prepares a chccksheet
indicating the type of procurement desired (sole source or
competitive), applicable contract clauses to be included in the final
contract, number of technical drawings to be mailed with the
solicitations (as specified in the DD1149) as well as any other
desired solicitation criteria, based on the acquisition management
code (AMC) assigned the item. The package is returned to PSP
who synopsizes the requirement, assigns a solicitation number to
the procurement, and prepares the solicitation (IFB or RFP) . In
addition, PSP orders required technical drawings (as specified by
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the buyer) from NATSF and the solicitation is forwarded to the
Navy Publication and Printing Support Office (NPPSO) for
reproduction. The entire synopsis period can take a minimunn of
52 days (15 days in the presolicitation period, 7 days during the
"waiting period" from the time the notice is forwarded to the
Commerce Business Daily in Chicago until publication, and a
minimum of 30 days after solicitations are mailed to prospective
vendors)
.
The PSP Branch writes the requisition and solicitation numbers
on the FOl and forwards the package to another section in the
branch where the required contract clauses are manually keyed
into the NIXDORF computer which provides an on-line interface
with the master computer; whole clauses are not typed by the
clerks but rather, specific clauses that have been programmed into
the master computer are identified and requested for printing by
the computer through the use of the NIXDORF interface. The
NIXDORF process (before the solicitation is forwarded to NPPSO)
normally takes two weeks. The normal waiting time for technical
drawings from NATSF is 20-30 days and is often in excess of that,
especially for technically complicated equipment. In addition, it
takes NPPSO one week to reproduce solicitations and final contract
clauses
.
The FOl package is returned to the buyer. PSP mails the
solicitations to prospective contractors; as bids are received during
the synopsis period they are sent to the bid room for safekeeping
until bid opening day. On bid opening day the bids are opened
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and a bid abstract is prepared summarizing each bidder by name,
unit price, quantity and bid price.
On the other hand, contractor proposals are forwarded to the
bid room for opening and distributed to the buyer as they are
received. Proposals are reviewed and analyzed -by the buyer who
determines the competitive range after an evaluation of the
various elements specified in the solicitation. Factors such as cost
or price, technical excellence of the contractor, cost realism,
experience, past performance, schedule, and other relevant factors
are considered. For sole-source procurements that do not have a
price history (first-time buy), the buyer contacts the contractor
to obtain a detailed cost breakdown or commercial sales history.
If the procurement price is over $100,000, the contractor is
required to prepare a SF 1411, Contract Pricing Proposal Cover
Sheet, for review and audit by the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) . A procurement of less than $100,000 requires an
"informal" cost breakdown by the vendor. The buyer performs a
detailed price and cost analysis as described in section B.2.b. of
this paper.
A competitive proposal requires that the buyer establish a fair
price based on commercial catalogs or fair market value. The
vendors' pricing history and other factors described in the previous
paragraph are reviewed and analyzed in order to determine which
proposal offers the greatest value to the Government, price and
other factors considered. The buyer next prepares a pre-
negotiation business clearance; procurements of less than $100,000
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in value are approved by the branch supervisor while
procurements over $100,000 are approved by the Contract Review
Board (CRB).
At the conclusion of discussions and negotiations with the
contractors the buyer obtains best and final offers (BAFO) and
prepares a post-negotiation business clearance and forwards it to
the branch supervisor or CRB, as appropriate. Upon approval of
the award by the branch supervisor or the CRB, the buyer
prepares a DD350, Individual Contract Action Report (over
$25,000). The FOl is then returned to PSP for consolidation of
applicable contract clauses; the contract is reproduced by NPPSO
and returned to PSP for mailing. The buyer mails a letter of
award to the successful contractor and the MA Branch is notified
of the award and the obligation of funds is recorded. PALT during
this administrative phase also includes the printing and mailing of
the contract as well as post-award activities required to put the
contract in place. The FOl package is logged in and out and
traced through every step of the PG phase of the process by means
of the WIP system bar codes and wands. While the PG portion of
PALT officially ends upon award of the contract by the buyer,
overall ASO PALT does not stop until the administrative (ADMIN)
phase has been completed; this phase takes 1-21 days. The PG
portion of PALT averages 60-200 days depending on the type of
award. Typically orders under BOAs take 30 days, non-BOAs take
115-180 days, while competitive procurements take 77-137 days
to get through the PG loop.
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During contract performance the buyer gets involved in
contract administration efforts by expediting the delivery of
required material. This is especially true in the case of small
firms where a resident Adnninistrative Contracting Officer (AGO) is
not present. Where an AGO is assigned to administer the
contract, the buyer, often prompted by the IM/ES team and
urgent supply assist requests from the fleet, works closely with the
AGO and his staff to expedite requirements and make fleet desires
known.
D. SUMMARY
In the first part of this chapter an analysis of the generic
procurement process was presented with a view toward putting the
various elements of PALT in perspective. This was followed by a
detailed explanation of the procurement process at ASO to provide
the reader with a basic understanding of the complexities of the
process of obtaining material for and by the Government.
Hopefully the reader has gained an appreciation for the
tremendously complex and labor-intensive nature of the spares
procurement process at ASO. A discussion of the factors that
impact upon PALT is presented in the following chapters and the
author will evaluate those elements both internal and external to
the ASO organization that affect PALT.
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III. THE ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the two major pieces of procurement
legislation that have been passed over the last four years and
which have contributed to increased PALT at ASO, Following a
discussion of the legislation, an evaluation is made of the overall
impact the legislation has had on ASO's procurement process.
Before continuing, however, it is important to mention that as
each Federal agency receives changes to the procurement
regulations, they are responsible for promulgating various internal
directives and procedural changes to comply with the new
regulations. Combine the multitude of changes that have taken
place in recent years with the vast differences that exist between
Federal agencies and the situation becomes even more confusing
and cumbersome to administer by the people involved in the
procurement process.
Over the last four years the Government, and in particular
DOD, has received a great deal of negative publicity over the
purchase of $400 hammers and $600 ashtrays. Each incident of
media sensationalism instigates another round of Congressional
inquiries of Federal agencies. With the Government procurement
system under heavy attack, agencies have implemented internal
measures to cope with the problems. For example, the Fraud,
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Waste and Abuse Hotline was established in 1982 to provide Federal
employees with a direct line to the head of the agency. Through
the Hotline, an individual can surface pricing violations or wasteful
practices
.
DOD awards over 15 million contracts each year with a value
in excess of $150 Billion. Even if all purchase transactions were
99.9% error-free there would still be 15,000 possible errors. Many
of the problems are attributed to administrative errors with few
actual cases of fraud being detected [Ref 4: p. 17]. Even so,
Congress has seen the need to generate procurement legislation
that, since 1982, has had a major impact on the Government's
method of conducting its procurement functions. As the body that
holds the ultimate power of the purse and the responsibility to
ensure that public funds are wisely spent. Congress has had to act
to ensure that the "horror stories" do not go unchecked.
The most sweeping change to the procurement regulations
initiated by Congress since the Armed Services Procurement
Reform Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and Administration
Services Act of 1949 was the Connpetition in Contracting Act (CICA)
of 1984. Since then, several other pieces of legislation have been
enacted by Congress in an effort to eliminate problems arising from
poor procurement practices. These include the Defense
Procurement Preform Act of 1984, the Small Business and Federal
Procurement Competition Enhancement Act of 1984, the Defense
Procurement Enhancement Act of 1985, and the annual National
Defense Authorization Acts. Although all of these reforms have
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mandated changes to procurennent procedures of one form or
other, two of thenn, CICA and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (FY87 DOD Authorization Act) which puts
into statute Navy's initiatives to reduce the number of
undefinitized contractual actions, have had the nnost significant
impact on PALT at ASO in recent times. The remaining statutes
mentioned above are extensions of CICA and further amplify
Congressional intent regarding the conduct of major systems
acquisitions and business practices of Defense contractors. The
researcher will therefore present a brief synopsis of these two
pieces of legislation to provide sufficient information to give the
reader an appreciation for the intent and policy behind the
legislative changes.
B. THE COMPETITION IN CONTRACTING ACT (CICA) OF 1984
CICA is perhaps the single most important piece of
procurement legislation enacted by Congress in nearly 40 years.
Mandating sweeping changes to the procurement process, CICA is
the direct result of national attention focused on the problems
encountered in Government procurement [Ref. 4: p. 118]. Over
80 percent of all Federal contract obligations originate from DOD.
For this reason the service Secretaries and senior military officials
have spent many hours testifying before Congress and defended
their much-publicized procurement practices. The overriding
thenne of the committee hearings and Senate and House floor
debates has been that the Government needed to push
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"competition" [Ref. 4; p. 18]. The full impact of CICA on DOD
agencies may take years to fully determine though it is certain
that Congress is intent on forcing the Services to seek competitive
contracts and thereby reduce the overall costs of procuring
weapons systems for DOD.
To accomplish its main purpose, increased competition in the
award of Government contracts, CICA created several new terms
to replace terms that previously had non-competitive connotations.
For example, the term "sealed bid" replaced "formal advertising"
while "competitive proposal" replaced the term "negotiation." In
addition to the changes in terminology, CICA changed the
procedures required to effect the award of contracts under the
sealed bid and competitive proposal methods of procurement. The
various criteria were enumerated in the previous chapter and are
presented here for review. Sealed bidding is the prescribed method
for purchases over $10,000 if the following criteria are met: (1)
the specification and requirements are non-restrictive; (2) time
permits solicitation, submission and evaluation of all sealed bids;
(3) the award will be made with reasonable promptness on the
basis of price and other price-related factors; (4) bids can be
evaluated without discussions with the bidders; and (5) there is a
reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed bid.
If, however, the above criteria cannot be met, then the
contracting officer must use the competitive proposal method. The
primary reason for using the competitive proposal method is to
promote and enhance the conduct of meaningful discussions with
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each of the offerors. Following the discussions, the contracting
officer will usually call for a best and final offer (BAFO) from each
bidder. However, under the competitive proposal process, the
contracting officer is required to reserve the right to award the
contract without discussions if it is determined that the initial
offers are acceptable and would result in the lowest overall cost to
the Government. [Ref 4: p. 127]
The problem with the old standard (formal advertising) was
that it equated the formal advertising method of procurement with
competition but did not sufficiently recognize that negotiated
procurements could also be competed. In addition, justifying the
use of negotiation obscured the real intent behind the legislation,
that of ensuring competitive procurennents . CICA, therefore,
clearly established a legislative precedent to compete all awards
regardless of which method of procurement was utilized. [Ref 4:
p. 120]. As a result of CICA, the statutory emphasis has shifted
from the method of procurement to the use of sources. No longer
is how you procure the principal matter of the law; rather it is
from whom you procure that is the foremost concern. CICA,
therefore, for the first time clearly established a legislative
requirement to compete regardless of the method of procurement.
Under the provisions of the Act, Government agencies may use
non-competitive procedures if ihe procurement fails into one of the
following categories as described in FAR Part 6.302, The seven
exceptions to procurement under less than full and open
competition are:
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1. When only one responsible source is available and noalternate
type of service will satisfy its needs.
2. Under unusual or compelling urgency, when the Government
would be seriously injured unless the agency limited the
number of solicited sources.
3. When restriction of an award to a particular source is
required because of:
a. the necessity to maintain a particular source to ensure its
continued availability in the event of national emergency
or to achieve industrial mobilization or
b. the award is required in order to establish or maintain
an essential engineering research or development
capability provided by an educational or other non-profit
institution or a federally funded research and
development center.
4. When the source is restricted under the terms of an
international agreement or treaty or by direction of a foreign
government that is reimbursing the executive agency for the
cost of the procurement.
5. When the item is a brand name commercial item for
authorized resale, or a statute expressly authorizes or
requires that the source be restricted.
6. When national security requires that the disclosure of the
executive agency's requirement be limited to the particular
source (s) from which it solicits the bid or proposal,
7. When the head of the executive agency determines it to be
necessary in the public interest to use procedures other than
competitive procedures. This exception must be the subject
of a written notification to the Congress, thirty days in
advance of the award of the contract.
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Depending upon the enforcement and interpretation of the
exemptions when making an award, the contracting officer must
prepare a Justification and Approval (J&A) . CICA requires written
J&As for ail proposed contract actions not providing for full and
open competition in excess of $25,000.
A megor element of CICA that ensures the contracting officer is
following the rules is the appointment of a competition advocate for
each activity with procurement authority greater that $25,000.
This senior procurement official is appointed by the commanding
officer and is responsible for ensuring that full and open
competition is maintained, that the exemptions are not
inappropriately circumvented, and that all non-competitive
procurements are reviewed. By design, Congress established the
competition advocate system through CICA as a check and balance
process to protect against abuses in the procurement process. [Ref.
5: p. 2],
Another major change imposed by CICA is the lowering of the
threshold for the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) from $500,000
to $100,000. Under CICA, prospective contractors are required to
certify their cost or pricing data (as of the date of the parties'
agreement on price) for procurements valued at $100,000 or
greater. This provision in the Act was intended to provide the
basis for retroactive price adjustments in the event that data
submitted prior to award of a contract are not accurate,
complete, and current without resorting to costly and time-
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consuming litigations. Without certification, agencies would lack
the legal wherewithal to deter defective pricing. [Ref. 6: p. 6]
CICA also changed the required times for Commerce Business
Daily (CBD) notices for solicitations and awards from the previous
15 day minimum to a new 45 day minimum synopsis plus
transmittal time. The new rules mandate that solicitations
involving $25,000 or more be synopsized in the CBD at least 15
days prior to release of the solicitation, and that deadlines for
receipt of bids and proposals be not less than 30 days after
publication of the synopsis. In addition, notice of award must also
be published for procurement actions of $25,000 and over if sub-
contracting opportunities are likely to occur. CICA not only
increased the time requirement for the synopsis but also added
more stringent rules to the contents of the synopsis. The
requirements for an acceptable synopsis are that: (l) it
accurately describes the Government's requirennent without
unnecessarily restricting competition; (2) it must clearly state
where a copy of the solicitation may be obtained and must provide
the name, business address, and telephone nunnber of the
contracting officer responsible for the procurement; and (3) it
must contain a statement that all responsible sources may submit
offers for consolidation by the agency. In addition, if the agency
expects to restrict the number of sources for a particular reason,
that fact must be fully disclosed in the synopsis and must include
the reason (s) for the restriction as well as the name(s) of the
intended source (s) of supply. The exclusion might be necessary to
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enhance competition in a particular service or supply area, for
example, restricting competition to small business firms only when
all small firms are allowed to compete for the procurement. [Ref.
4:p.l3l]
In general, the feelings about the impact CICA has had upon
the procurement process are mixed. Contract awards within DOD
under full and open competition have risen dramatically over the
last two years. Statistics show that the Army has increased its
percentage of dollars awarded competitively from 40.2 percent in
FYS2 to 46.9 percent in FYS 5. The Navy and Air Force have
nearly doubled the number of dollars spent competitively while the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has reached a record level of 96.
S
percent of all contracts awarded competitively [Ref. 5: p. 3].
However, according to the 19S7 handbook, Management of the
United States Government , there has been a substantial increase in
the amount of time required for the Government to procure
supplies and services to operate on a daily basis. To quote from
the handbook,
The acquisition process is so complex that product and service
users sometimes do not get what they need when they need it.
While the time required to process a specific acquisition varies
with the procedures used and the type of product or services
required, administrative lead-times of 27-37 weeks are not
uncommon for competitively negotiated acquisitions in the
$25,000-$5 Million range. Such long lead-times add to the
uncertainty, risk, and expense and reduced productivity
in agency programs. [Ref. 7: p. 87]
Additional problems that contribute to overall inefficiencies the
Government is currently experiencing is the fact that a majority of
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the dollars spent are still non-competitive (over 53% in 1985) and
there is a general perception among contracting officers that their
authority is being eroded due to the increase in the review and
approval process [Ref. 7: p. 94].
The changes enumerated above that were brought about by
CICA have contributed to increased PALT at ASO. A description of
the effects on PALT will be presented in the last section of this
chapter
.
C. INITIATIVES CONCERNING UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTUAL
ACTIONS
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
(1987 DOD Authorization Act) became the law of the land in
November 1986. The Act authorizes appropriations for the
military functions of DOD and mandates improvements in defense
procurement procedures. Section 908 of the Act addresses specific
requirements relating the undefinitized contractual actions (UCAs)
.
Unpriced orders (UPOs) are categorized under the broad grouping of
undefinitized contractual actions (UCAs) which includes letter
contracts and unpriced change orders resulting from engineering
change proposals and UPOs under basic ordering agreements
(BOAs) . All three of these contractual actions share a common
characteristic, they are normally issued in advance of pricing and
are therefore priced retrospectively or aiter-ihe-fact. FAR 16.703
describes a BOA as a written instrument of understanding between
the Government and the contractor which contains appropriate
contract terms and conditions. The order under the applicable
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BOA terms and conditions represents the actual contract. BOAs do
not normally specify individual line items, quantities or prices and
the order normally indicates detail specifications or a statement of
work. These orders can be priced retrospectively or they can be
priced prospectively. A BOA can be structured to cover various
time lengths from one to three years. A BOA is not a contract.
FAR 16.703 further defines a BOA as follows:
A Basic Ordering Agreennent nnay be used to expedite
contracting for uncertain requirements or supplies or
services when specific items, quantities, and prices are
not known at the time the agreement is executed, but a
substantial number of requirements for the type of supplies
or services covered by the agreement are anticipated to be
purchased from the contractor. Under proper circum-
stances, the use of of these procedures can result in
economies in ordering parts for equipment support by
reducing administrative leadtime, inventory investment,
and obsolescence due to design changes.
A BOA is reviewed each year and any revisions to it are
accomplished by means of a bilateral agreement between the
Government and the contractor rather that modifying the BOA
itself in a retrospective fashion. The revised BOA applies only to
orders issued after the effective date of the modification and
cannot be modified by the order. Prior to issuing an order against
the BOA, the contracting officer must either price the order in
advance or issue a ceiling priced order, which limits the
Government's liability, or he may issue a UPO with no ceiling.
The FAR requires that if a ceiling priced order or UPO is issued,
the contracting officer must ensure that one of the following
conditions is met:
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1. The BOA provides for adequate pricing early in the
performance of the work; or
2. The need for the supplies or services is compelling and
unusually urgent. In this situation, the contracting
officer shall price the order as soon as practical.
The Navy Acquisition Regulations Supplement (NARSUP)
requires that the agency contemplating the establishment of a BOA
that includes provisions for price redetermination obtain written
approval fronn the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Each BOA
will stipulate timeframes for the receipt of contractor proposals
which usually fall no later than 60 days after the receipt of the
orders. In addition, an agreed upon definitization date is
stipulated. The NARSUP further stipulates that the definitization
date shall not exceed either 180 days following the issuance of an
order, or the completion of 40 percent of the work performed by
the contractor, whichever occurs first.
At ASO, unpriced BOA orders have historically been the
primary vehicle for the procurement of spare parts for two
reasons: (l) a BOA allows for the placement of an order without a
price proposal; and (2) less documentation is required to award
and issue an order than is the case with a more traditional fornn
of contract that is based on contractor proposals, field pricing
reports, and negotiations. In essence, che BOA process contributes
to the streamlining of the procurement process and results in a
more timely and efficient response to fleet demands while reducing
the administrative burden on procurennent personnel. The use of
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BOA orders and UPOs are recognized and legitimate methods of
reducing PALT.
From a pure business standpoint undefinitized (retroactively-
priced) orders have a number of negative points including: (1) the
Government is placed at a disadvantage in negotiating prices (as
opposed to pricing contracts prospectively, or up-front); (2) the
contractor's incentive to control costs is diminished; (3)
unnecessary obligation of funds on the basis of excessively high
pre-negotiation cost estimates and the Government's inability to
use expired funds when they could have been used were it not for
the inflated cost estimates; and (4) the tendency for contractors to
realize a higher profit than the actual risk incurred would
otherwise dictate. [Ref. 8]
Spurred by an audit conducted by the Naval Audit Service and
published in December 1985 [Ref. 8] pointing to the above
inefficiencies, the Director of Contracts and Business Management
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding
and Logistics) (ASN (S&L)) issued a memorandum in October 1985
[Ref. 9] concerning UCAs and included a draft policy directive to
all systems command headquarters and requested the agencies to
provide feedback on the proposals. This was followed by a
memorandum of guidance from Secretary Pyatt, ASN (S&L), in
November 1985 [Ref, 10] concerning UCAs. The major thrust of
Secretary Pyatt 's memorandum is that UCAs have been used
primarily to satisfy fleet requirements, maintain obligation plans
and meet program schedules. The memorandum further indicates
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that UCAs do not achieve cost control and directed the following
actions
:
1. Reduce the number of UCAs issued in FY86 by 20 percent
and the outstanding dollar value by 30 percent compared
to the end of FY85,
2. Review UCAs for possible deobligation of funds.
3. Require the receipt of an adequate price proposal prior to
the issuance of a UCA in excess of $1 Million. Any
exceptions are to be approved at flag/senior executive
service levels.
4. Require that contractors propose and segregate costs
by order.
5. Include a contract provision for the withholding of progress
payments for delinquent proposal submission.
6. Disallow the inclusion of additional requirements to
existing orders.
7. Prohibit the use of unpriced orders (UPOs) for contractor
support services or in other instances where requirements
cannot be adequately defined.
8. Include UCA definitization performance as a key Command
indicator,
9. Negotiate profit rates commensurate with the level of the
risk experienced by the contractor at the time of definitiza-
tion.
Further guidance was provided bv Secretary Pyatt in another
memorandum issued m February 1986 [Rei. llj. The mem-
orandum indicates that the major reason that UCAs go past the
scheduled definitization dates is because of the submission of
inadequate proposals or the late submission of proposals. He also
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states that in these instances the contractor continues to be funded
through progress payments. The major thrust of the
memorandum is to point out that when the contractor is
delinquent in submitting definitization proposals, the contracting
officer should withhold progress payments.
Secretary Pyatt issued another memorandum in August 1986
[Ref. 12] in which he indicated he was contemplating the
establishment of an even more aggressive goal for FY87 as
compared to the goals he established for FYS 6. The goal is based
on a 50 percent reduction in dollar backlog compared to FYS 6.
In March 1986 Representative Wyden introduced a bill (H.R.
4461) that would severely limit the use of UCAs [Ref. 13], The
major intent of the bill was to limit the use of UCAs to "urgent
needs" and for FY87, limits UCAs to 10 percent of the amount of
funds appropriated for defense procurement. For FYS8 and FYS 9,
the percentage of UCAs is to be decreased to 5 percent.
Representative Wyden's bill, H.R. 4461, was referred to the
House Armed Services Committee and was included in the FYS7
DOD Auhorization Act (Section 908) which was passed in both
Houses and signed into law in November 1986. The Act limits the
use of funds for undefinitized contractual actions and requires that
semi-annually during fiscal years 1987, 1988 and the first half of
1989, the service Secrstaries report to Congress if the level of
obligations for UCAs exceeds 10 percent of total obligations for their
respective Service. In order to allow for an adequate "break-in
period" to implement the provisions of the new requirement and to
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avoid unnecessary delay in the issuance of UCAs for valid purposes,
service Secretaries can exceed the 10% linnitation during the first
semi-annual period. The Act stipulates that if a service Secretary
exceeds the 10 percent linnitation for UCA obligations in any six-
nnonth period, the Secretary will be prohibited from further using
UCAs.
Four categories of contracts are exempted from the limitations
of the Act: (l) foreign military sales, (2) purchases less than
$25,000, (3) special access programs (subject to special oversight
procedures), and (4) Congressionally-mandated long-leadtime
purchases. Additionally, the Act contains a waiver provision
allowing the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to breach the 10
percent threshold for "urgent and compelling considerations relating
to national security or public safety" by notifying Congress of such
a waiver within 30 days of the issuance of the waiver. This
would allow the services some flexibility to obligate funds for UCAs
in "extreme emergency situations" without being restricted by the
10 percent ceiling.
.In addition to the general restrictions stated above, the Act
sets forth the following specific requirements:
1. The requirement that a UCA be definitized within 180 days
of the submission of a qualifying proposal.
2. Initial spares procurement is exempted from the requirement
to definitize within 180 days of the submission of a qualifying
proposal because the definitization of UCAs depends on the
timely submission of contractor proposals.
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A report to Congress by SECDEF not later than 1 July 1987
detailing the actions taken by DOD to effectively manage
the issuance and timely definitization of UCAs. The reportis
to include a determination on the feasibility of the 10
percent limitations effective 1 October 1987 as well as a
recommendation for any modification or repeal of the limi-
tation based on DOD's dennonstrated ability to effectively
manage UCAs. If no changes are required, the 10 percent
limitation becomes effective on 1 October 1987. [Ref. 14: p. 49]
D. THE EFFECTS OF PROCUREMENT LEGISLATION ON ASO'S
PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The statutes addressed in this chapter were enacted by
Congress as a direct result of specific problems that were brought
to the attention of the American public. While it is important for
Congress to protect the vested interests of the taxpayer, it it
questionable whether Congress' role should include the micro-
management of the procurement process to the point of legislating
the "fine print" on each contract let by a sanctioned Government
procurement agent. When problems arise in a particular segment
of the procurement process, it ought to be the particular Federal
agency's responsibility to police its own actions and resolve the
issues and make changes accordingly through the efforts of
management in order to preclude the reoccurrence of the
problems
,
The mere process or change, regardless of the wisdom of its
purposes, is inherently disruptive. All Federal agencies need time
to assimilate the changes brought about by legislation and time for
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the procurement system to adjust and stabilize. By one count the
FAR has been amended 14 times since April 1984. The Defense
Supplement to the FAR (DFARS) was amended 11 times during the
same period, to say nothing of the numerous amendments that
have been made to other agency supplements. With over 100 bills
currently pending in Congress to make further changes to the
acquisition regulations, it is easy to understand why Federal
agencies need time to prepare for an even more difficult
adjustment period. [Ref. 5: p. 13]
Since the passage of CICA there has been general agreement by
procurement professionals that many of the Act's provisions have
resulted in additions to the administrative processing time required
to award a contract. At ASO this has clearly been the case. The
Navy's initiatives that culminated in the inclusion of Section 908 in
the FY87 DOD Authorization Act to reduce UCAs have also resulted
in increased PALT at ASO. The researcher has learned from
interviews with key individuals in the procurement process that
the following changes required by CICA have contributed to
increased PALT at ASO:
1. The preparation and processing of justifications and authori-
zations (J&As) for non-competitive procurements can
increase PALT by as much as 180 days. J8.As for procure-
ments under $100,000 are approved by the branch
head and procurements over $100,000 require concurrence
of the Competition Advocate. ASO's Commanding Officer
must approve those above $1 Million while the office of the
Secretary approves those above the $10 Million threshold.
2. The stipulation for increased synopsis time in the CBD prior
to releasing the solicitation and the increased synopsis period
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after release of the solicitation has also increased the admin-
istrative process. At ASO the minimum total synopsis period
is 52 days (15 days prior to solicitation, 30 days during
solicitation, and a 7 day waiting period to ensure the synop-
sis request reaches the CBD in Chicago, IL)
.
3. The establishment of the Competition Advocate Directorate
to review and approve all non-connpetitive sourcing pro-
cedures for procurements over $100,000 has added an
average of six months to the administrative process and is
due to complexities in some procurements as well as
difficulties in qualifying second sources.
4. The requirement for contractors to provide certified cost
or pricing data for procurements over $100,000 results
in increased PALT because contractors tend to take more
time to prepare proposals and they take every measure
to ensure their proposals are accurate and complete. In
addition, buyers and procurement analysts are also more
careful about performing more thorough and complete
- price and cost analyses.
5. Increased competition has resulted in increased PALT
because it can take an average of 90 days to develop
and qualify firms which are competing for the first
time. The number of pre-award surveys has also
increased which necessitates additional human resources
to review and analyze contractors' proposals.
6. Unanticipated offers (UAOs) can also increase PALT by one
to eight months. UAOs occur when an unknown contractor
responds to a CBD synopsis after solicitations have been
mailed to interested contractors (the contractor who sub-
mits the UAO did not request a solicitation package) . If
the item in question is a critical, safety-of-flight item,
the UAO source requires NAVAIR approval. The source
for a non-criticai item can be approved by the compeution
advocate's staff. If the source is approved during the
period of the solicitation, ASO will then proceed with
the procurement and request best and final offers from
competing contractors. If the source is not certified during
the solicitation period, the procurement is stopped until
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the matter is resolved but is predicated on the stock
position of the item. The IM is asked to review stock
position; if there is sufficient stock on hand, the
procurement is split to allow the initial solicitation process
to continue. The remaining quantity is held in abeyance
until the UAO source can be certified. If, however, the IM
indicates the material is required without further delay,
the procurement continues with the initial sources and the
UAO source is advised that his proposal cannot be considered
for the current procurement based on urgency of the
material and his proposal will be reviewed. The course of
action taken is driven by current stock position,
7. Field pricing reports from supporting organizations such as
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the
Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS) can take
up to six months to be completed. Increased competition
has caused increasingly more field pricing requests which
these agencies are not able to process in a timely manner.
A procurement analyst who requested anonymity indicated
that often the field pricing reports are not as accurate as
they might be and also indicated that this is so because the
agencies feel pressured to respond quickly and therefore
sacrifice accuracy for a more timely report. This creates
additional work for the buyer who has to check the
accuracy of field pricing reports.
8. Despite efforts to increase competition, it was learned that
many prospective second sources don't respond to solicita-
tions. Many small firms are accustomed to dealing with
prime vendors to satisfy the Government's needs and would
rather not undertake the additional burden of dealing
directly with the Government bureaucracy. The net effect
is a reduction in the number of possible competitors and
often leads to sole-source procurements from prime vendors
which increases PALI because of the J&A requirement.
9. The increased interest in "competition" by potential bidders
has driven up the demand for bid sets and technical
drawings (in microfiche form) . It takes time and human
effort to prepare, package and mail the solicitations to
interested offerors. All too often, however, the number
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of bids or proposals actually received is disproportionate
to the number of solicitations mailed.
The recent initiatives dealing with UPOs have also had an
effect on PALT at ASO. UPOs are typically used by ASO as
admin-istrative tools to promptly place on order the requirements
for aviation spares and the repair of repairables. Prior to the
recent initiatives discussed earlier in this chapter, 75-80 percent of
ASO's business consisted of UPOs. In FY86 the volume was
reduced to 60 percent and in the current fiscal year the volume of
UPOs cannot exceed 40 percent of ASO's total business and the
obligation of funds for UPOs cannot exceed 10 percent of available
funds.
These initiatives have changed the way ASO conducts business.
The requirement to prospectively price orders has resulted in
requirement dates being missed because buyers are sometimes not
able to price the orders quickly enough and therefore contracts
cannot be awarded in a timely manner. Backlogs in the buying
sections have increased and it is common for the typical buyer to
have a workload of 150-200 active PRs at any given time. The
number of CBD synopses has increased (virtually every
requirement is now synopsized) which has increased the workload
and backlogs in the PSP branch. It is too early to evaluate the
full impact of the UPO initiatives although it is clear that PALT
will increase significantly until the backlog is worked off. PALT
will taper off, but probably at a higher level than before the
initiatives were put in place. What has typically been a 60-70
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day PALT window in the PG section is expected to increase to 180-
200 days, according to an experienced manager in the PG division
at ASO.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has described two of the major initiatives enacted
in recent years by Congress and the Navy designed to improve the
acquisition process. Starting with CICA through the Navy's actions
to reduce the number of UCAs and the FY87 DOD Authorization
Act which made the UCA initiatives applicable to all of DOD, it
provided a perspective of the events that have contributed to
increased PALT at ASO in recent years. The key provisions of
these legislative mandates were discussed as were the essential
requirements included in the statutes that affect PALT. The last
section of the chapter described the specific changes required in
ASO's conduct of the procurement process as a result of CICA and
UCA initiatives.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE fANOVA) OF PALT STATISTICS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of the statistical data provided by ASO. The
primary focus of the analysis is to determine the extent to which
unpriced order (UPO) initiatives have affected BOA PALT as well as
the extent to which CICA initiatives have affected definitive
contracts PALT. The analysis will include the researcher's
interpretation of the results of the ANOVA. The data analyzed are
the average monthly PALT for basic ordering agreements (BOAs)
and definitive contracts covering the period from October 1984
through March 1987.
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) OF ASO'S PALT STATISTICS
Chapter III of this report presented a discussion of the
acquisition environment and included a detailed account of the two
recent legislative measures that have contributed the most to
increased PALT at ASO. What follows is a presentation and
analysis of the data provided by ASO which represent the total
average PALT figures for BOA orders and "C" series individual,
definitive) contracts covering the period from October 1984
through March 1987.
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Figures 3 and 4 are a graphic representation of the data.
Figure 3 is a portrayal of PALT behavior for BOA orders during this
period and shows that, in general, PALT has gradually increased,
with some periods of decline, since October 1984, The two curves
depicted in the graph show the separation of "Total PALT" and "PG
PALT". This was done deliberately to segregate those actions which
take place within the procurement division (PG) from the total.
The total PALT figures do, however, include the time elements
represented by the PG PALT curve. For example, in October 1984
average total PALT for BOAs was 127 days, 75 of which were
accounted for in the PG branch, and so on through the entire
graph. The same relationships are present in Figure 4 for
contracts
.
The two vertical lines in each graph were inserted to highlight
the events that have contributed the most to increased PALT at
ASO. In Figures 3 and 4 the vertical line labeled "APR 85"
represents the passage of CICA while the line labeled "NOV 85" in
Figure 3 represents the beginning of the Navy's initiatives relative
to UPOs. The vertical line labeled "FEB 86" in Figure 4 represents
the researcher's estimate of when the effects of CICA initiatives
would be evident through either increased or decreased PALT, and
is a way of showing the effects of CICA, "PALT time away",
February 86 is a best estimate and was arrived at by projecting
the total average pre-CICA PALT (316,41 days, or 10 months)
forward and assumes that PALT would continue to exhibit the
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Figure 4. Contracts PALT
Source: Developed by researcher
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to segregate the data into three distinct groups; A, B, and C; the
data analysis which follows will be in terms of these groups. In
Figure 3, Group A represents pre-CICA data, group B CICA and
pre-UPO, and group C UPO; groups B and C combined represent
post-CICA data. In Figure 4, group A represents pre-CICA data,
group B CICA, and group C post-CICA effects on PALT; groups B
and C combined represent post-CICA data.
While the graphs show a general upward trend and overall
increase in PALT for both BOA orders and contracts, the
researcher is interested in specifically analyzing the extent to
which CICA and UPO initiatives have affected PALT. To that end,
an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to test if the
different groups or populations (A, B, and C) have different
means. Specifically, the researcher is interested in whether the
differences in means are statistically significant. ANOVA is useful
in answering the question, do all of the populations have the same
mean? More important, do the population means differ any more
than one would expect from just random variation?
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Using the Minitab statistical computing system, the data were
entered and the ANOVA test was run, with the following results.
The means of the various groups are:



































An analysis of these mean PALT statistics clearly shows that
for both BOA orders and contracts, PALT has increased steadily
fronn October 1984 to March 1987. Of particular significance is the
nnean PALT figure "B+C" for each of the four curves; this shows
that PALT has increased significantly over the pre-CICA period,
period A. The total mean PALT for BOA orders increased by 27.29
days from the pre-CICA period; PG PALT for BOA orders increased
10.63 days; Total PALT for contracts increased by 58.11 days; and
PG PALT for contracts increased 27.88 days. On the surface these
numbers appear straightforward, however, they represent
averages of average figures provided by ASO and it is therefore
difficult to determine how many contracts and BOA orders took a
longer or shorter period of time to award. To more accurately
analyze the mean PALT statistics, the ANOVA test was run to test
the null hypothesis that the means of the populations are ?qual,
that is, Hq\ meanA = meang = mean^; by contradicting the null
hypothesis, the research hypothesis H^: nnean^ ^ meang p^ mean^
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can be supported. In this nnanner it can be shown statistically
that the mean average PALT has or has not increased.
The specific results of the ANOVA test for the null hypothesis
(Ho) are sunnmarized below. Minitab calculates the F-RATIO
which is a test statistic that represents a value computed from the
data that is used in determining whether or not the sample data
are compatible with the null hypothesis. Generally, values of the
test statistic that are very unlikely under the null hypothesis, but
relatively more likely under the research hypothesis (Ha), tend to
contradict the null hypothesis. The F-RATIO is a useful test
statistic; if the statistic computed is large, the variation between
the various groups of data is much greater than the variation due
to random error and the null hypothesis that the average mean
PALT of the groups of data are all equal can be rejected. How
large the F-RATIO must be is determined by the critical value
from an F-table with the desired alpha level or degree of
confidence. For this particular test, the researcher used a 95
percent confidence level to compute the F-RATIOs. The results of
the ANOVA test are as follows:
1. BOA Orders (Total PALT):
Group Critical Value F-RATIO
A vs. B 4.75 47.44
A+B vs. C 4.20 8.31
A vs. B+C 4.20 9.87
A vs. B vs. C 3,35 6.03
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BOA Orders (PG PALT)
:
Group Critical Value F-RATIO
A vs. B 4.75 0.08
A+B vs. C 4.20 5.83
A vs. B+C 4.20 2.11
A vs. B vs. C 3.35 2.82
Contracts (Total PALT):
Group Critic2^1 V$ilue F-RATIO
A vs. B 4.60 7.29
A+B vs. C 4.20 93.84
A vs. B+C 4.20 17.43













1. Analysis of PALT for BOA Orders
An analysis of the results reveals that in nearly every
case, the null hypothesis of equality among the population means
can be rejected and the research hypothesis that the means are
not equal can be supported. For BOA orders, mean total PALT has
increased in every group but most dram.atically between groups A
and B. An F-RATIO of 47.44 is significantly greater than the
critical value 4.75, so the null hypothesis that mean^ = meang
can be rejected. The remainder of the BOA order total PALT
75
group comparisons show the same general results; while the F-
RATIOs are not as high as the F-RATIO for A vs. B, the null
hypothesis can be rejected since differences in the means are
statistically significant. The results for BOA order mean PG PALT
are interesting in that the F-RATIO for three of the four group
comparisons is smaller that the critical values. For example, A
vs. B, with an F-RATIO of 0.08 and a critical value of 4.75
indicates that events within A and B did not lead to differences in
the actual means since the difference in the means are not
statistically significant. The difference in actual means between A
vs. B is 1.22 days and can be explained as the occurrence of
random variation or random events and not the events themselves
(in this case, the passage of CICA) . For BOA orders, the Navy's
initiatives to reduce- UPOs appears to have had an effect on PALT,
since the F-RATIO of 5.83 for A+B vs. C is higher than the critical
value of 4.20, and the null hypothesis of equal nneans can be
rejected
.
It is interesting to note that, although PALT behavior for
BOA orders has shown an overall increasing trend since October
84, it has shown periods of erratic behavior. Prior to the Navy's
initiatives to reduce the number of UPOs, total PALT increased
steadily from a pre-CICA level of 126.98 to 145.68 days after CICA
(period B) . As discussed earlier, this appears to be due to random
variation and not the passage of CICA itself. Spurred by Secretary
Pyatt's directive in November 85 (discussed in the previous
chapter), total PALT for BOA orders rose sharply from 149.36 to
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181.25 days. PALT remained steady through February 86 then
began a decline to a low of 127.8 days in May 86. The researcher
speculates that internal actions within ASO to reduce the number
of UPOs accounted for the decline; by reducing the number of new
UPOs the procurement workforce was able to concentrate on a
fewer number of orders and issue them more quickly. After May
86, total PALT for BOAs steadily increased to 183.57 days in
October 86. PG PALT for BOAs also increased from 59.59 to 97.79
days in the same period. This increase can be attributed to UPOs
being replaced by priced orders which take longer to definitize.
From October to November 86 both total and PG PALT showed a
significant decline; total PALT was reduced to 112.98 days and PG
PALT decreased to 68.89 days. This decline can be attributed to
the normal conduct of business associated with the beginning of a
new fiscal year. The end of the fiscal year is characterized by a
major effort to clear the pipeline and award all remaining
competitive contracts thus enhancing the "numbers" for the year's
competition goals. During the last two months of the fiscal year
pending sole-source buys and UPOs are dollar constrained and are
therefore awarded early in the new fiscal year.
In October and November 86, the previous year's
competition pipeline having been cleared, ASO had increased
flexibility in issuing UPOs since dollar constraints don't become a
factor until later in the fiscal year. Additionally, sole-source buys
remaining at the end of the fiscal year can be awarded with
relative ease. Issuing UPOs and awarding sole-source
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procurements takes considerably less time to accomplish which
accounts for the significant reduction in PALT in October, from
183.57 to 112.98 days. Another reason for the decline in PALT in
October 86 was the impending reorganization of the PG branch
which was designed to reduce the ratio of buyers to supervisors
and therefore increase buyer efficiency; the reorganization was also
intended to align the buying sections by weapon system in a
similar manner as the IMs in the Weapons Management (WM)
Branch are organized. This functional reorganization was also
designed to enhance the working relationship between the IMs and
the respective weapon system buyers and thus reduce the
redundancy which existed prior to the reorganization of PG. Prior
to the reorganization it was not uncommon for several buyers to
deal with a single vendor for similar parts; reorganization has
resulted in a more efficient use of human resources within PG by
having the same buyer (s) deal with the same vendors on a
repetitive basis.
After the passage of the DOD Authorization Act in
November 86, PALT began to increase because increasing numbers
of BOA orders were required to be prospectively priced, as
discussed earlier. In December 86, total and PG PALT began an
upward surge to new highs of 205.73 and 141.5 respectively. The
researcher learned that a major contributing factor to the rise in
PALT was procurement analysts having to learn new pricing
techniques and procedures for BOA orders. UPO initiatives resulted
in additional pressures being exerted on the procurement analysts
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because of the requirement for prospective pricing. Prospective
pricing increased PALT primarily because the required DCAA audits
and field pricing reviews can take as long as 60 days to complete.
In addition, procurement analysts are faced with conducting
negotiations with contractors based on cost estimates (as opposed to
actual costs incurred under a UPO scenario); this often leads to
discrepancies between the DCAA audits and contractor proposals
and ultimately results in additional time for the procurement
analysts to resolve these differences and arrive at a fair and
reasonable contract price. Procurement experts at ASO speculate
that PALT for BOA orders will continue its upward trend for the
foreseeable future until the procurement workforce is trained to
adequately deal with UPO initiatives and a new way of doing
business. Since 70% of ASO's past business has been through the
use of BOAs, it is clear that the FY87 DOD Authorization Act will
have a significant impact on PALT for some time but will level off
once the procurement workforce has had sufficient time to learn
new procedures as well as the opportunity to work the backlogs
created by these initiatives. In summary, the critical factor for
BOA orders appears to be variability in PALT even though mean
PALT increased from group A to C. Although mean PALT is
statistically significant, it is not very strong.
2. Analvsis of PALT for contracts
The results of the ANOVA test for contracts also show that
both total and PG PALT have steadily increased. In every case
except one, the null hypothesis of equality among the population
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means can be rejected and the research hypothesis that the nneans
are not equal can be supported. The one exception is the ANOVA
between group A and B for PG PALT, In all other cases, the
research hypothesis can be statistically supported since the F-
RATIOs are larger than their corresponding critical values. In the
case of group A vs. B for PG PALT, the F-RATIO of 3.68 is less
than the critical value of 4.54. The true average means are
218.68 and 228.00 respectively, a difference of 9.32 days. The
statistical difference between these means can be attributed to
random variation and not necessarily the passage of CICA. This is
plausible since the effects of CICA would not be seen immediately
but rather in later periods. As was explained earlier, the
researcher estimated that the effects of CICA would not be evident
until "PALT time away", which was projected to be 10 months
after the passage of CICA. Using 10 months as the adjustment
factor, the effect on PALT from awarding new contracts after the
passage of CICA is shown in Figure 4 by the vertical line labeled
"FEB 86". It can be seen clearly that 10 months after the passage
of CICA, February 86, total PALT increased from 329.71 to 368.19
days. Similarly, PG PALT increased from 232.95 to 237.36 days.
This small increase in mean PG PALT can be explained by the fact
that CICA's mandate for the establishment of a competition
advocate initially caused the most "growing pains" and contributed
the most to the increase in total PALT; as described in Chapter II,
the CA loop is outside of PG's realm of responsibility. As is the
case with BOA orders, it is interesting to note that both total and
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PG PALT have shown erratic behavior since the beginning of the
Navy's initiatives to reduce UPOs in November 85, although the
behavior was not as extreme.
In summary, the primary issue with PALT for
contracts is a significant increase in mean PALT with variability
nearly equal, to that of BOA orders after November 85. There
appears to be a difference in how BOA order and contract PALT
react to CICA and UPO initiatives. BOA orders show an increase in
variability resulting from UPO initiatives while contracts show a
steady increase in mean PALT. Total and PG PALT for contracts
show a predictable increase which is the result of more consistency
in the application of CICA initiatives as compared to BOAs.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of
ASO's average monthly PALT statistics for the period covering
October 1984 through March 1987. The results of the analysis
show that for BOA orders, mean PALT has increased since the
passage of CICA. More important, the Navy's initiatives to reduce
the number of UPOs appears to have had an effect on BOA PALT.
Although BOA PALT has shown an increasing trend, it exhibited
erratic behavior since the start of UPO initiatives. The increase in
BOA PALT can be attributed m part to the UPO initiatives which
resulted in prospective pricing and definitization of BOA orders
which increases the administrative burden on procurement
personnel. After the passage of the FY87 DOD Authorization Act in
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November 86, PALT began an upward surge due to increasing
numbers of up-front definitization actions following an
administrative effort in August and September 1986 to award
competitive contracts and meet the competition goals as well as a
megor internal reorganization within the Procurement Directorate
designed to improve the internal management of contracts.
PALT for contracts showed a significant increase as a result of
CICA. Using 10 months as an adjustment factor to estimate when
the initial effects of CICA would be evident, PALT showed a steady
increase. While total PALT and PG PALT both increased, the
increase in total PALT was more significant due to the initial
"growing pains" associated with the establishment of the
Competition Advocate Directorate as well as other CICA initiatives.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACT TYPES AND METHODS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the course of conducting research for this thesis the
researcher learned that the principal contracting
methods/techniques used by ASO for the procurement of spare
parts are competitive procurement, sole source negotiation, and
priced and unpriced orders under BOAs. While there are several
methods available from which to choose, management feels that in
the existing acquisition environment the methods mentioned above
are best suited for meeting ASO's needs and goals.
In order to determine whether ASO is taking full advantage of
the various contract types and methods at their disposal, the
researcher conducted a review of the available methods with a
view toward recommending feasible alternatives. Given the
mandates for increased competition and a reduction in the number
of UPOs imposed by CICA and the FY87 DOD Authorization Act, the
choices become more limited. However, the analysis serves the
purpose of exploring possible combinations of contract types and
methods that might offer feasible alternatives to procurement
personnel at ASO.
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B. DESCRIPTION OF AVAILABLE CONTRACT TYPES
What follows is an abbreviated description of the various
contract types contained in FAR Part 16 and the conditions under
which they may be selected for use. Following this, a similar
description of the various contracting methods contained in FAR
Parts 14, 15, and 17 will be presented. This discussion will
culminate in "decision matrices" used by the researcher to
evaluate the most appropriate combinations of contract types that
can be used by procurement personnel at ASO. The various
contract types are:
1. Fixed-price (FP) Contract? .
Taken as a whole, FP contracts contain a fairly complex
structure of potential pricing arrangements. They provide for a
firm price or, in appropriate cases, an adjustable price. FP
contracts providing for an adjustable price may include a ceiling
price, a target price (including target cost), or both. Unless
otherwise specified in the contract, the ceiling price or target price
is subject to adjustment only by operation of contract clauses
providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the contract
price under stated circumstances. Under the FP arrangement, the
contract price is limited by the allocation of risk between the
parties. The degree of shared risk between the parties is allocated





Under an FFP arrangement, the contractor bears all
of the risk of performance; he guarantees successful performance
of contract requirements including accomplishment by a specified
delivery date. The contractor is financially responsible for
successful performance without any right to change in price. He
has the incentive to perform efficiently and secure as profit 100
percent of the costs saved, if less than anticipated costs. The
Government is obligated to pay the contract price regardless of
actual costs of performance and therefore prefers the FFP
arrangement over all others since it is able to plan for the timely
delivery of nnaterial at a cost which has been defined in the
contract
.
b. Fixed-price Incentive (FPI) .
An FPI contract provides for adjusting profit and
establishing the final contract price by a formula based on the
relationship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost. The
final price is subject to a price ceiling which is negotiated at the
outset. Under an FPI contract the contractor is paid more profit
if performance is connpleted at a cost below the target cost and is
paid less profit if the cost at completion exceeds the agreed upon
target cost. The two types of FPI contracts are:
(l) Fixed-pricg Incentive Firm fFPIF) .
The FPIF arrangement specifies a target cost, a
target profit, a price ceiling, and a profit adjustment formula, all
of which are negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the
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maximum the contractor will be paid. At the completion of
performance, the final cost is negotiated and the final price is
established using the formula. If the final cost is less than target
cost, the contractor earns a higher profit; if final cost is morethan
target cost, less profit is earned. If the final negotiated cost
exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a
loss.
(2) Fixed-price Incentive (Successive Targets') (FPIS) .
In the FPIS arrangement, the parties negotiate at
the outset an initial target profit, a price ceiling, a formula for
fixing the firm target profit, and a production point at which the
formula will be applied. The initial formula also provides for a
ceiling and floor on the firm target profit. When the production
point for applying the formula is reached, the firm target cost is
then negotiated and the firm target profit is automatically
determined in accordance with the formula. At this point, two
alternatives are possible: (l) the negotiation of an FFP
arrangement or (2) the negotiation of an FPIF contract.
FPI arrangements are designed to encourage
contractors to improve their contract performance in the area of
cost, quality performance and delivery schedule by harnessing the
profit motive by providing the contractor with a dollar incentive to
reduce costs, improve end-item performance, and/or speed up
delivery. An FPI contract is appropriate when: (l) an FFP
contract is not suitable; (2) when the nature of the procurement
is such that the contractor's assumption of a degree of cost
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responsibility will provide a profit incentive for effective cost
control and performance; and (3) if the contract also includes
incentives on technical performance and/or delivery, the
perfornnance requirements provide a reasonable opportunity for the
incentives to have a meaningful innpact on the contractor's
management of the work.
c. Fixed-price Redeterminable (FPR)
.
The FPR arrangement avoids the inclusion of a sharing
formula, yet leaves the final negotiation of price until performance
of work has proceeded to the point at which costs of performance
are well enough known to predict (and negotiate) the final cost
and price necessary for completion of work. The redetermined
price is set forth in the contract when negotiated. The two types
of FPR contracts are:
(1) Fixed-price Redeterminable fProspectivel fFPRP) .
The FPRP is a series of two or more FFP contracts
that are negotiated at fixed times during the performance of the
contract. This allows for gathering more cost data as more
experience is encountered in the procurement. This contract type
can be used in acquisitions of quantity production for which it is
possible to negotiate a fair and reasonable FFP for an initial period,
but not for subsequent periods of performance.
(2) Fixed-price Redeterminable fRetroactivel frPRR') .
The FPRR contract provides for adjustment of the
contract price after the work has been done. The parties
determine the degree of cost responsibility at the final negotiation
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of price, and price is based on a subjective determination of the
manner in which the contract has been performed. Because of
this subjective evaluation of profit, the contractor does not have a
positive incentive to control costs. The FPRR contract is
appropriate for research and development (R&D) contracts of
$100,000 or less when it is established at the outset that a fair
and reasonable FFP cannot be negotiated and that the amount
involved and short performance period make the use of any fixed-
price contract type impracticable,
d. Fixed-price with Economic Price Adjustment (FP-EPA)
An FP-EPA arrangement is appropriate in those
situations where a high degree of economic uncertainty exists
during an extended period of contract performance and is designed
to protect both parties against significant economic fluctuations in
labor or nnaterial costs or to provide for contract price adjustments
in the event of changes in the contractor's established prices.
e. Firm-fixed-price, Level-of-effort Term Contracts
(FFPLET)
.
The FFPLET arrangement requires that the contractor
provide a specified level of effort, over a stated period of time, on
work that can be stated only in general terms. This arrangement
also calls for the Government to pay the contractor a fixed dollar
amount oased on ihe eifort 2xpended rather than on the results
achieved. The FFPLET contract is normally limited to research
undertakings of limited scope in which progress toward a
technological achievement, not completion, is sought.
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2. Cost-Reimbursgment Contracts .
Unlike FP-type contracts, cost-reimbursement contracts
provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent
prescribed in the contract. An estimate of total cost is established
for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a ceiling that
the contractor may not exceed (except at his own risk) without
the approval of the contracting officer. Cost-reimbursement
contracts are suitable for use only when uncertainties involved in
contract perfornnance do not permit costs to be estimated with
sufficient accuracy to use any type of FP contract. The principal
feature of cost-type contracts is the method of payment: the
Government reimburses the contractor for his costs, subject to a
cost limitation clause in the contract. Beyond that, the contractor
need not continue work unless additional funds are provided and
the contracting officer authorizes continued perfornnance. The
contractor pronnises only his best efforts and delivery and
performance are therefore uncertain. The Government assunnes all
of the financial risk in every cost-type contract except the cost
sharing contract where the risk is divided between the parties.
The types of cost-reimbursement contracts are:
a. Cost-no-fee (C-NF)
.
The C-NF contract is used primarily for research
undertakings in which a university or other nonprofit educational
institution is the performing party. The contract provides no sum





This type of contract provides for payment to the
contractor of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the
contract. The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but nnay
be adjusted as a result of changes in the work to be performed.
The CPFF contract permits contracting for efforts that might
otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it provides
the contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs. The
Government agrees to reimburse the contractor for all allocable,
allowable, and reasonable costs incurred during contract




The CPIF arrangement provides for an initially
negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the
relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. It
specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees,
and a fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the
fee payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the
formula. The formula provides, within limits, for increases in fee
above target fee when total allowable costs are less than target
costs, and decreases in the fee below target fee when total
allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or decrease is
intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the
contract effectively. When total allowable cost is greater than or
less than the range of costs within which the fee-adjustment
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formula operates, the contractor is paid total allowable costs, plus
the minimum or maximum fee.
The CPIF contract is appropriate for development and
test programs when a cost-reimbursement contract is necessary
(eg
.
, when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not
permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any
type of FP contract) and a target cost and a fee adjustment
formula can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the
contractor to manage effectively.
d. Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF)
.
The CPAF contract contains special fee provisions that
provides a means of applying incentives in contracts which are not
susceptible to finite measurements of perfornnance necessary for
structuring incentive contracts. It provides for a fee consisting of
of a base amount fixed at the inception of the contract and an
award annount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part
during perfornnance and that is sufficient to provide nnotivation for
excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity,
and cost-effective management. The amount of the fee is based
on a unilateral, judgnnental evaluation of the contractor's
performance in terms of the criteria stated in the contract.
3. Indefinite-deliverv contracts riDC) .
Indefinite-delivery contracts (IDCs) are appropriate when
the exact times and/or quantities of future deliveries are not
known at the time of contract award. The three types of IDCs
are: (l) definite-quantity contracts; (2) requirements contracts;
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and (3) indefinite-quantity contracts. The characteristics of these
IDCs are:
a. Definite-quantity contracts (DQC)
.
DQC contracts provide for delivery of a definite
quantity of specific supplies for a fixed period, with - deliveries to be
scheduled at designated locations upon order. They can be used
when it can be determined in advance that a definite quantity of
supplies will be required during the contract period and the
supplies are regularly available or will be available after a short
lead time.
b. Requirements contracts.
A requirements contract provides for filling all actual
purchase requirements of designated Government activities for
specific supplies during a specified contract period, with deliveries
to be scheduled by placing orders with the contractor . The
contracting officer states a realistic estimated total quantity in the
solicitation and resulting contract although it may not be based on
stable or normal conditions affecting requirements. The contract
states the maximum limit of the contractor's obligation to deliver
and the Government's obligation to order as well as maximum and
minimum quantities the Government may order under each
individual order or during a specified period of time. A
requirements contract can be used when the Government
anticipated recurring requirements but cannot predetermine the
precise quantities of supplies needed, and is appropriate for
commercial products or commercial-type products. Commercial
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items are items sold or traded to the general public in the course
of normal business operations at prices based on established catalog
or market prices while commercial-type products are commercial
products modified to meet some Government-peculiar physical
requirement or addition or are otherwise identified differently from
their commercial counterparts.
c. Indefinite-quantity contracts (IQC).
IQCs provide for an indefinite quantity, within stated
limits, of specific supplies to be furnished during a fixed period,
with deliveries to be scheduled by placing orders with the
contractor. The contract requires the Government to order and
the contractor to furnish at least a stated minimum quantity of
supplies, and the contractor to furnish any additional quantities, if
ordered, not to exceed a stated maximum. For the contract to be
binding, the minimum quantity must be more than a nominal
quantity, but should not exceed the amount that the Government
is fairly certain to order.
4. Time-And-Materials. Labor-Hour, and Letter Contracts .
Time-and-materials contracts provide for acquiring
supplies on the basis of: (l) direct labor hours at specified fixed
hourly rates that include wages, overhead, general and
administrative (G&A) expenses, and profit; and (2) materials at
cost, including, if appropriate material handling costs as part of
material costs. Since this contract type provides no positive profit
incentive to the contractor for cost control or labor efficiency,
Government surveillance of contractor performance is required. A
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time-and-materials contract can be used only after the
contracting officer executes a J&A that no other contract type is
suitable and only if the contract includes a ceiling price that the
contractor exceeds at his own risk.
Labor-hour contracts are a variation of the time-and-
materials contract and differ only in that materials are not
supplied by the contractor. Labor-hour contracts can be used
only when it is not possible at the time of placing the contract to
estimate accurately the extent or duration of the work or to
anticipate costs with any reasonable degree of confidence.
Letter contracts are written preliminary contractual
instruments that authorize the contractor to begin immediately
manufacturing supplies or performing services. They may be used
(l) when the Government's interests demand that the contractor
be given a binding commitment so that work can start
immediately; and (2) when negotiating a definitive contract is not
possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement. When a letter
contract is awarded based on price competition, the contracting
officer must include an overall price ceiling in the contract. The
contract also must include a dcfinitization schedule (within 180
days after the date of the letter contract or before completion of
40 percent of the work to be performed, whichever occurs first) as
well as a limitation of government liability clause that does not
exceed 50 percent of the estimated cost of the definitive contract
unless approved in advance by the official that authorized the
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letter contract. A letter contract also requires a J&A that no
other contract type is suitable.
5. Agreements .
a . Basic agreements (BA)
.
A basic agreement (BA) is a written instrument of
understanding, negotiated between the parties, that (l) contains
contract clauses applying to future contracts between the parties
during its term; and (2) contemplates separate future contracts
that will incorporate by reference or attachment the required and
applicable clauses agreed upon in the basic agreement. A basic
agreement is not a contract. A basic agreement should be used
when a substantial number of separate contracts may be awarded
to a contractor during a particular period and significant recurring
negotiating problems have been experienced with the contractor.
BAs may be used with negotiated FP or cost-reimbursement
contracts and the agreement must contain a provision for
discontinuing its future applicability upon 30 days' written notice
by either party. A basic agreement is reviewed annually and is
revised as necessary and is incorporated into a contract by specific
reference or by attachment.
b. Basic ordering agreements (BOAs)
.
The details of BOA orders were presented in Chapter
III of this thesis; to review, a BOA is a written instrument of
understanding that contains: (l) terms and clauses applying to
future contracts (orders) between the parties during its term; (2)
a description, as specific as practicable, of supplies or services to
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be provided; and (3) methods for pricing, issuing, and delivering
future orders under the BOA. A BOA is not a contract. A BOA
may be used to expedite contracting for uncertain requirements for
supplies or services when specific items, quantities, and prices are
not known at the time of the agreement is executed, but a
substantial number of requirements, for the supplies or services
under the agreement are anticipated to be purchased from the
contractor
,
C. DESCRIPTION OF AVAILABLE CONTRACTING METHODS
1. Sgalgd b ids.
The sealed bid method of procurement was described in
detail in Chapter II of this thesis. To summarize, sealed bidding is
a method of procurement that employs competitive bids and is
used under the following conditions: (l) tinne permits the
solicitation, submission, and evaluation of sealed bids; (2) the
award will be nnade on the basis of price and other price-related
factors; (3) it is not necessary to conduct discussions with offerors
about their bids; and (4) there is reasonable expectation of
receiving more than one sealed bid. Under the mandate for full
and open competition required by CICA, all responsible sources are
permitted to compete.
2. Two-step sealed bidding .
Two-step sealed bidding is a combination of competitive
procedures designed to obtain the benefits of sealed bidding when
adequate specifications are not available. Its main objective is to
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permit the development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly
restrictive statement of the Government's requirements, including
an adequate technical data package, so that subsequent acquisitions
may be made by conventional sealed bidding. The two-step sealed
bid method is especially useful in procurements requiring technical
proposals, particularly those for complex items.
The first step consists of the request for, submission,
evaluation and (if necessary) discussion of a technical proposal.
No pricing is involved, and the objective is to determine the
acceptability of the supplies or services offered. Questions relating
to technical requirements are clarified and while contractor
responsibility is not resolved, conformity to the technical
requirements is evaluated.
The second step involves the submission of sealed bids by
those contractors who submitted acceptable technical proposals in
step one. Bids submitted are evaluated and contract award is
made using sealed bid procedures.
3. Competitive proposals .
The competitive proposal method was discussed in detail in
Chapter II of this thesis. To summarize, a competitive proposal is
used to discuss and negotiate between the parties and allows for
offerors to submit proposals for the purpose of "bargaining" for
such things as pries, schedule, technical requirements, type of
contract, or other terms of the proposed contract. The essential
elements of the competitive proposal method include: (l) price or
cost to the Government are an evaluation factor in every source
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selection while other factors may include cost realism, technical
excellence, management capability, personnel qualifications,
experience, past performance, schedule, and any other relevant
factors; and (2) while the lowest price or lowest total cost to the
Government is normally the deciding factor in source selection, in
certain acquisitions the Government may select the source whose
proposal offers the greatest value in terms of performance and
other factors. Under the mandate for full and open competition
required by CICA, all responsible sources are permitted to compete,
4. Multiyear contracting (MYC) .
MYCs are special contracts covering more that i-year's
but not more than 5-year's requirements, unless otherwise
authorized by statute. Total contract quantities and annual
quantities are planned for a particular level and type of funding as
displayed in a current 5-year development plan. Each program
year is annually budgeted and funded and, at the time of award,
funds need only to have been appropriated for the first year. The
contractor is protected against loss resulting from cancellation of
the contract by contract provisions which allow reimbursement of
costs included in the cancellation ceiling.
The use of MYC is generally encouraged to take advantage
of (1) lower costs; (2) enhancement of standardization; (3)
reduction of administrative burdens m the placement and
administration of contracts; (4) substantial continuity of
production or performance, thus avoiding start-up costs, pre-
production testing costs, and phase-out costs; (5) Stabilization of
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the contractor's work force; (6) avoidance of the need for
establishing and "proving out" quality control techniques and
procedures for a new contractor each year; (7) broadening the
competitive base with the opportunity for participation by firms
not otherwise willing or able to compete for lesser quantities,
particularly in cases involving high start-up costs; and (8) provide
incentives to contractors to improve productivity through
investment in capital facilities, equipment, and advanced
technology.
5. OptJQn?.
The use of options is a means by which the Government
exercises the unilateral right in a contract, for a specified time, to
purchase additional supplies or services called for by the contract,
or may extend the term of the contract. Options may be included
in contracts when it is in the Government's interest. Conditions
under which options are not appropriate when the contracting
officer deternnines that the foreseeable requirements involve: (l)
minimum economic quantities (quantities large enough to permit
the recovery of start-up costs and the production of the required
supplies at a reasonable price) ; and (2) delivery requirements far
enough into the future to permit competitive acquisition,
production, and delivery.
The contracting officer may not use options if: (l) the
supplies or services are readily available in the open market; (2)
the contractor will incur undue risks; (3) an indefinite quantity or
requirements contract is appropriate (except that options may be
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used to extend the terms of such contracts)
; (4) market prices for
the supplies or services involved are likely to change substantially;
or (5) the option represents known firm requirements for which
funds are available unless: (a) the basic quantity is a learning or
testing quantity; and (b) competition for the option is
impracticable once the initial contract is awarded.
6. Sole source negotiation.
Sole source negotiation (non-competitive procurement) is
an approved contracting method which the Government may use
for contracting without providing for full and open competition,
The seven conditions under which sole source procurement may be
used were detailed in Chapter III of this thesis. A contract
awarded under this method must cite the specific authority (U.S.
Code) under which it was awarded. The contracting officer is
required to solicit offers from as many potential sources as is
practicable under the circumstances, and the use of sealed bids or
competitive proposals, as appropriate, are the prescribed methods
of procurement, as described in FAR Part 6. The agency must
also obtain approval for the sole source procurement through the
use of a J&A.
D. ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT TYPES AND METHODS
Having described the various coniract types and methods
available to procurement personnel at ASO, the task becomes one
of analyzing the alternatives in order to arrive at the most feasible
contracting techniques that can be used for the procurement of
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spare parts at ASO. Figure 5 is a decision matrix developed by the
researcher and was used to evaluate the contract types against the
needs and concerns expressed by procurement managers at ASO in
their selection of the appropriate contract type. To indicate
favorable consideration of a contract type - for the needs or
concerns, a "+" was inserted; unfavorable consideration is
indicated by a "-", and a neutral position is shown by a "o". In
addition, asterisks "*" appearing under the "regulatory" concern
column indicate that a specific FAR passage or other regulation
either precludes or prohibits the use of that particular contract
type (regardless of the researcher's evaluation marks) ; for
example, an FFPLET contract is appropriate only for conducting an
investigation or study in a specific research and development
(R&D) area. An "*" in the "regulatory" concern column indicates
that this is the preferred contracting method within DOD. All
other contract types are approved for use when circumstances
warrant, but the FFP is preferred over all other methods. In
choosing the best contracting types and methods to use various
factors have to be considered, the most important of which is
statutory guidance. While the FAR does not specifically address




parts must be acquired so as to assure the requisite safe,
dependable, and effective operation of the equipment. Where
it is feasible to do so without impairing this assurance, parts
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However, where this assurance can be had only If the parts
are acquired from the original manufacturer of the equipment
or his supplier, the acquisition should be restricted accordingly.
Parts that are fully identified and can be obtained from a
number of known sources, and parts for which fully adequate
manufacturing drawings and any other needed data are avail-
able with the right to use for acquisition purposes are to be
acquired on a competitive basis. In general, such parts are
of a standard design and configuration. . .-and include indivi-
dual items that are susceptible of separate acquisition, such as
resistors, spark plugs, electron tubes, or other parts having
commercial equivalents
.
Parts not within the scope of the paragraph above generally
should be procured (either directly or indirectly) only from
sources that have satisfactorily manufactured or furnished
such parts in the past, unless fully adequate data, test
results, and quality assurance procedures, are available with
the right to use for procurement purposes to assure the
requisite reliability and interchangeability of the parts, and
acquisition on a competitive basis would be consistent with the
assurance of the requisite safe, dependable, and effective
operation of the equipment. In assessing this assurance, the
nature and function of the equipment of which the part is
needed should be considered. Parts qualifying under this criteria
are normally sole source or source controlled parts which exclu-
sively provide the perfornnance, installation and interchange-
ability characteristics required for specific critical applications. . .
[Ref. 15: Part 17.7203]
An analysis of Figure 5 shows that by default the firm-fixed
price (FFP) contract is the most logical and feasible alternative, for
several reasons. The nature of replenishment spare parts is such
that they nave a stable design, a price nistory aue to repetitive
procurement, adequate price competition, a history of prior
purchases, available cost or pricing information that can be
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derived from technical drawings, and there are very few
uncertainties associated with them because of stable design.
Another feasible alternative is the fixed-price incentive (FPI)
contract, specifically the FPIF arrangement. An FPI arrangement
is appropriate for use when an FFP contract is not suitable; it can
also be used when the nature of the supplies are such that the
contractor's assumption of a degree of cost responsibility will
provide a positive incentive for effective cost control and
performance. In addition, the contractor's technical performance
and/or delivery can be incentivized to have a meaningful impact
on his management of the work. Because the profit varies
inversely with the cost, the FPIF provides a positive, calculable
profit incentive for the contractor to control costs. Although it is
a feasible alternative, however, the FPI is used only when the
agency prepares a statement indicating that the FPI arrangement
is likely to be less costly than any other contract type or when it
is impractical to obtain the needed supplies of the kind or quality
without its use. Incentive contracts require considerable
administrative cost and effort because of the requirement for cost
and technical reviews and assessment of status of the incentive.
FPI contracts, therefore, are especially appropriate for use when
making high dollar value procurements
The mdeiinite delivery conxract (IDC), including DGCs,
requirements, and IQCs, also provides a feasible alternative from
the standpoint that it allows for a minimum level of stocks to be
maintained, the contractor can ship material directly to users (the
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fleet), and the Government is only obligated to the minimum
quantity specified in the contract. The IDC arrangement has
strong benefits from the inventory control and financial
management perspectives
.
Of the remaining contract types, BOAs offer another extremely
feasible alternative primarily because of the reduced administrative
burden, the improved ability of the agency to obligate available
funds, and the ability of the agency to obtain needed material
quickly to satisfy emergent fleet requirements and prevent
material stock-out prior to the receipt of material competitively
procured. BOAs can also be used for competitive procurements; if
a contractor successfully negotiates a fair and reasonable price
through the competitive proposal process, an order may be issued
to contract for the requirements if a BOA currently exists with the
appropriate terms and conditions [Ref. 16].
An analysis of Figure 6 reveals once again that by default,
sealed bidding, two-step sealed bidding, and competitive negotiation
are the most appropriate procurement methods due to the
mandates imposed by CICA. The asterisks (*) in the "regulatory"
concern column indicates that, for sealed bidding, two-step sealed
bidding, and competitive negotiation, statutory regulations mandate
the use of these methods when circumstances dictate. Under the
current Congrgssionaily-mandated rules m CICA, full and open
competition is the by-word for the solicitation and award of
Government contracts. Because of Congressional intent to allow all
















































































preferred method of contracting. Even though competitive
procurement requires a great deal of effort and results in increased
PALT, the current mandate for increased competition provides the
impetus for agencies to follow. Competitive procedures availablefor
use in fulfilling the requirement for full and open competition are:
(l) sealed bids; (2) competitive proposals; and (3) two-step sealed
bidding [Ref. 3: Part 6.102].
Sole source negotiation results when circumstances dictate the
use of this procedure, as described in Chapter III, and requires
written approval in the form of a justification and authorization
(J&A), as mentioned earlier. The (*) sign in the "regulatory"
concern column indicates that sole source negotiation is an
unfavorable method of procurement unless circumstances dictate
its use. The seven circumstances under which sole source
negotiation may be used are restrictive and have a substantial
impact on the agency's flexibility in the solicitation and award of
contracts. Sole source negotiation does, however, allow the agency
the ability to purchase material from a single source under the
appropriate circumstances
.
While it would appear that multi-year contracting (MYC)
offers a number of advantages including lower costs, enhanced
standardization, reduced administrative burden, continuity of
production, and a more sxabie contractor work rorce, experience at
ASO has shown that MYC is not a feasible alternative because the
cost savings advertised in the MYC method don't materialize.
They have found that in the few instances where MYC contracts
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were awarded (primarily spare parts for ground support equipment
(GSE)), the price for the first year's procurement was
substantially less than for follow-on multi-year contracts. This is
because contractors' investment in special tooling and equipment
are written off during the first year which results in higher
contract prices in follow-on years because contractors can't take
advantage of the equipment depreciation which means higher
contract prices to the Government. The double asterisk (**) in the
"regulatory" concern column for MYC contracting denotes that this
is not a preferred contracting method since, as stated in FAR Part
17.102-1, specific statutory authority is needed for an agency to
nnake financial commitments for amounts greater than those
appropriated annually by Congress.
Options also offer a very feasible alternative because they allow
the agency increased flexibility in the exercise of contracts. ASO
uses options extensively in the procurement of spare parts; the
option clauses used consist of the purchase of up to 100 percent of
the initial buy quantity, and remains in effect for 120 days. The
price ceiling specified in the option clauses used by ASO stipulates
that the option price is not to exceed the unit price of the parts
procured under the base contract.
To summarize, for spare parts procurement at ASO the FFP
arrangement oifers ihe best alternative for contract :ype due to
the nature of the material as well as placement of complete cost
responsibility on the contractor while allocating risk equitably
between the parties. The FPI arrangement is also favored because
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it provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor
to control costs. The IDC contract is also favored because of
inventory control and financial considerations. Finally, the BOA
arrangennent is considered feasible because it enables ASO to obtain
needed material quickly and prevent stock-outs while allowing for
competition. Because of statutory requirements, sealed bidding,
two-step sealed bidding, and competitive negotiation are the most
appropriate contracting methods for use by ASO while sole source
negotiation, when appropriate, can also be used for the acquisition
of spare parts. Options can also be used to increase the flexibility
of the agency's alternatives.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter presented a review of the various contract types
and contracting methods in order to asses whether ASO is
harnessing the full potential available through these techniques.
The researcher determined that, due in part to statutory
constraints, the sealed-bidding, two-step sealed bidding,
competitive negotiation, options, and sole source negotiation are all
viable contracting methods. The researcher also determined that
the FFP, FPI, IDC, and BOA arrangements offer the most feasible
alternative contracting methods.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PREFACE
The researcher attempted to answer the following primary
research question: Are there contracting techniques that can be
employed to reduce PALT for spare parts procurement, and if so,
what are they?
Analysis of the research data suggests that while factors
external and internal to ASO's procurement process contribute to
increased PALT, there are procurement methods that ASO can use
to enhance the process and reduce PALT. The research
accomplished in this study identified several factors that have
contributed to increased PALT for spare parts procurement at ASO.
These factors are presented in the conclusions cited in this chapter.
The recommendation portion will address the identified shortfalls;
this will be followed by a discussion of the research questions and
suggestions for further research.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Conclusion 1
Recent legislation, specifically CICA and the initiatives to
reduce the num.ber of UPOs, has had an effect on the spare pans
procurement process which has resulted in increased PALT at ASO.
As stated in Chapter III, Section D, CICA's mandate for
increased competition among available sources for the award of
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Government contracts has, by design, created impediments to the
spare parts contracting process by requiring the appointment of a
competition advocate to ensure that full and open competition is
maintained and that the exemptions are not abused. The CA
portion of the process has resulted in an average PALT increase of
six months due to complexities in some procurements as well as
difficulties in qualifying second sources. Despite efforts to solicit an
increased number of vendors to compete for award of contracts,
many prospective vendors are more reluctant than in the past to
become directly involved with the Government bureaucracy and
prefer instead to deal with prime vendors. This further
complicates matters and often leads to increased PALT because of
the sole source J&A requirement. The preparation and processing
of J&As for non-competitive procurements can increase PALT by as
much as 180 days, depending on the dollar value and level of
authorization required for individual procurements.
The stipulation for increased synopsis time in the CBD prior
to and after the release of the solicitation adds a minimum of 52
days to PALT. In addition, the requirement for contractors to
provide certified cost and pricing data for procurements with a
reduced threshold of $100,000 has added to PALT because
contractors are more careful than ever before in ensuring they
submit accurate and compieteiy auditable cost/pricmg data. This
requirement in turn has created a backlog in the field pricing
support effort; field pricing reports from DCAA and DCAS
organizations can be delayed by as nnuch as six nnonths, and the
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degree of thoroughness and accuracy with which pricing audits are
performed has declined.
Since as much as 80% of ASO's contract awards have
historically been through the use of BOAs, many of them unpriced
to take advantage of the benefits of quick response to emergent
fleet requirements, the requirement to reduce the number of UPOs
has resulted in requirement dates being missed because
procurement analysts have to spend more time prospectively
pricing orders under BOAs, The increased number of CBD synopses
for BOAs has created additional workload and backlogs in the
administrative section of the PG Branch, wjiich contributes to
increased PALT.
As discussed in Chapter IV, mean BOA order total PALT
has increased by 31.04 days from the pre-CICA period. Mean
PALT has shown erratic behavior since the beginning of the Navy's
initiatives to reduce the number of UPOs in November 1985, but
has increased by 21.69 days over the pre-CICA period. PG PALT
for BOAs has shown the same general trend. Mean total and PG
PALT have increased significantly since November 1986 and is
likely to continue its upward trend until the procurement
workforce is better able to deal with the UPO initiatives and a new
way of doing business,
Coniracts PALT has mcrsased steadily since October 1984,
Mean total PALT has increased by 84 . 37 days since that time
while mean PG PALT has only increased by 42.63 days, While
CICA initiatives have affected the entire procurement process, it is
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clear that mean total PALT has almost doubled over mean PG
PALT due to the establishment of the Competition Advocate
Directorate and the more stringent J&A requirements and reduced
certified cost/pricing data thresholds discussed above.
2. Conclusion 2
An analysis of the various contract types and contracting
methods available to procurement personnel indicates that ASO is
using appropriate techniques for spare parts procurement although
there may be feasible alternatives that are being overlooked.
The principal contracting methods/techniques used by ASO
are competitive procurement, sole source negotiation, and priced
and unpriced orders under BOAs. ASO uses FFP contracts
exclusively. The researcher is lead to believe after careful analysis
of the various contract types and methods that ASO is not taking
full advantage of increased flexibility available through the use of
FPI-type contracts. While the FPI contract is appropriate, the
researcher believes that the impact on PALT for the acquisition of
spare parts through its use may be negligible and perhaps negative
due to the additional administrative requirements imposed on the
agency.
The researcher also believes that the IDC contracting
method can be employed to reduce PALT because the nature of
spare parts requirennenis permits me agency lo take advantage oi
the benefits offered by this method. For example, the major
advantage of the DQC method is that it affords the agency the
ability to procure definite quantities of supplies when they are
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known in advance and have been procured through the
competitive process. The nature of spare parts procurement is
such that the agency has historical records of past procurements
at its disposal and is normally able to project the quantity of
supplies required with reasonable accuracy. On the other hand,
requirements contracts offer the same advantage when the exact
quantity of supplies in not known because of unstable or abnormal
conditions affecting requirements.
Similarly, the IQC method offers the advantage of
procuring indefinite quantities of supplies over a fixed period by
placing orders with the contractor for at least a stated minimum
quantity and up to a stated maximum quantity.
3. Conclusion 3
The researcher believes that ASO has taken positive
measures to deal with the complexities of the process mandated by
CICA and UPO initiatives.
Two recent initiatives undertaken at ASO, the
reorganization of the PG Branch and the installation of the WIP
procurement request tracking system, have had a positive impact
on the process. The reorganization of the PG Branch, designed to
reduce the ratio of buyers to supervisors and therefore increase
buyer efficiency; and the alignment of the buying sections by
weapon system and ihus enhance the working relationship between
the IMs and their respective weapon system buyers, has resulted
in a more efficient use of human resources within the PG Branch.
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The WIP procurement request tracking system has enabled
procurement managers to track individual PRs within the PG
Branch. The WIP also provides management tools in the form of
reports that allow managers the ability to monitor contract close-
out efforts and other internal activities from start to finish. While
the WIP has improved management's ability to monitor progress
within PG (and the entire procurement process, when WIP is fully
implemented), is a management information (MIS) and therefore
has limited application as a productivity enhancement tool that is
required to allow procurement analysts to more effectively manage
their day-to-day activities.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
While it is evident that the initiatives mandated by CICA and
Section 908 of the FY87 DOD Authorization Act have contributed to
increased PALT, it is incumbent on agencies to become more
innovative in their approach to the procurement process. Today's
acquisition environment, over-regulated as it may be, is the result
of Congressional intervention aimed at improving the process.
Despite the good intentions of Congress, there is a general feeling
among procurement managers that our acquisition process is overly
micro-managed and overregulated to such a high degree that they
nave a difficult time keeping up with :he conszantiy cnangmg
regulations
.
It therefore becomes necessary for agencies to look for ways to
improve and streamline the process in-house to counter the effects
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of this legislation. Accordingly, the following recommendations are
presented by the researcher as possible methods of addressing PALT
while maintaining the spirit and intent of full and open competition




Streamline the acquisition process and take advantage of
the benefits of concurrency by releasing the CBD synopsis before
the FOl buy package is forwarded to the PG Branch. It is evident
from the research that valuable time can be saved by releasing
the synopsis sooner. As described in Chapter II, the FOl package
enters the PG loop after review by the IM/ES team, the CA
Branch, and the Small Business Representative; the buy is
assigned to a procurement analyst who prepares a checksheet
indicating the type of procurement desired as well as other desired
contract clauses. The package is then forwarded to the PSP
Branch where the synopsis is prepared and other administrative
functions take place.
Valuable time can be saved if the Equipment Specialist (ES)
is allowed to notify the buyer of the nature of the procurement so
that the buyer could make a decision on the appropriate method of
procurement. The ES could then notifv PSP of the results and
request that the procurement oe synopsized ac 'hat point. 3y the
time the FOl finds its way to the buyer, the synopsis period will
have neared completion and the procurement could then proceed
without having to wait an additional 22 days (15 days for the
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prcsolicitation plus 7 days "dead time" to ensure the synopsis is
published)
.
Another activity that can be streamlined is the ordering of
drawings, described in Chapter II, Rather than waiting for the
FOl package to be reviewed by the procurement analyst and then
having PSP order the drawings specified by the ES on the DD-
1149, time can be saved by having the IM/ES team notify PSP by
telephone of the number of drawings sets required for the
procurement. Since it can take NATSF up to 30 days to provide
the needed drawings, a portion of this time can be saved by
requesting drawings ahead of current schedule.
2. Rgcommendatipn 2
To minimize the potential for duplication of administrative
effort for the procurement of similar requirements within the
option period, procurement personnel must ensure that options,
when available, are exercised to the fullest extent vice initiating
new procurement actions for the same items.
3. Recommendation 3
Implement a decision support system (DSS) to allow for
increased buyer efficiency. As discussed in Conclusion 3 above, the
WIP procurement request tracking system is a MIS designed to
enable management to more closely monitor the procurement
process. The WIP does not include the capabiiity of allowing
procurement analysts to manage their day-to-day activities such
as "ticklers" for expediting and follow-up on procurements.
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What is needed to increase the effectiveness of
procurennent analysts is a DSS to facilitate the day-to-day
management of the procurement process. Features of the DSS
might include document control capabilities and provisions for
buyer support services, automated document preparation,
information storage and retrieval, automated interface capabilities
and a wider range of current and accurate management
information not available on the WIP system. The potential
benefits of a DSS are increased buyer efficiency and a reduction of




Implement the use of IDC contract types when
appropriate.
As discussed in Conclusion 2, IDC contracts can be made
available for use when making repetitive procurements.
5. Recommendation 5
The researcher believes that ASO should seek regulatory
relief or redress for the 10 percent limitation on the use of UPOs,
This might be accomplished through a reallocation of the
percentage goals within the Navy as a whole. For example, ASO's
percentage of UPOs might be increased to 50 oercent while other
agencies' decreased to an appropriate levei so that the Navy as a
whole remains within the specified 10 percent goal.
While the current initiatives to reduce the number of
UPOs have had an adverse effect on PALT at ASO, as discussed in
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Chapters III and IV of this thesis, it is felt that the judicious use
of UPOs has far-reaching implications toward the attainment of
readiness, competition, and inventory goals. The researcher
concurs with the conclusion reached by the author of a recent
study of unpriced contractual actions under BOAs at ASO. The
author of the study concluded that, while the use of UPOs has
enabled procurement managers to meet aggressive competition goals
as well as meeting obligation rates and maintaining required
inventory levels, "... the ability to choose the level of UPO activity
should be left to the acquisition manager as long as the
definitization requirements are met" [Ref 17: p. 41-43].
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Are there contracting techniques that can be employed to
reduce PALT for spare parts procurement and if so, what are
they?
The research leads the author to conclude that changes to
the contracting techniques currently employed at ASO are not
required. Instead, it is believed that a spirited application of the
techniques now in place can be made to reduce PALT.
Increased management awareness and attention to the
benefits of streamlining the procurement process through
concurrency in the CBD synopsis and the ordering of technical
drawings, discussed in Conclusion 1 and Recommendation 1 above,
can have an effect on ASO' ability to minimize PALT.
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Additionally, increased automation of the procurement
function through the installation of a decision support system,
discussed in Recommendation 3 above, has implications for
improved buyer efficiency and management information not
available in the system now in place.
2. Subsidiary Question 1
What are the essential connponents of PALT?
As discussed in Chapters I and II, PALT consists of those
actions which take place from the time when the requirements
document is generated to the date when the contract is signed.
At ASO, PALT starts accumulating at the point when the SDR
response is certified by the RRB and the response is manually
input into the mainframe to produce an FOl procurement package;
PALT stops at the completion of the ADMIN phase when funds are
obligated.
3. Subsidiary Question 2
How have recent DOD initiatives to reduce spare parts
prices and increase competition affected PALT?
It is clearly evident from the research that CICA and
Section 908 of the FY87 DOD Authorization Act have contributed to
increased PALT at ASO. Chapters III and IV discussed the effects
of these initiatives on PALT.
4. Subsidiary Question 3
Do recent DOD initiatives relative to spare parts
procurement adequately address PALT?
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It appears from the research findings that CICA and
Section 908 of the FY87 DOD Authorization Act place an overriding
emphasis on reducing costs, improving competition, and
strengthening the accountability of the procurement workforce
engaged in the procurement process. CICA's mandate for full and
open competition in the award of Government contracts and the
DOD Authorization Act's mandate for reducing the level of UPOs
clearly ignores any effects on the administrative processing of
procurement requests by Government agencies. Chapters III and
IV of this thesis discuss the effects of these legislative acts on the
procurement process and PALT at ASO.
5. Subsidiary Question 4
. What are the principal contracting techniques currently
used for spare parts procurement?
As discussed in Chapter V of this thesis, ASO uses the FFP
type of contract. The contracting methods used for the
procurement of spare parts are competitive negotiation, sole source
negotiation, sealed bids and priced and unpriced orders under
BOAs.
6. Subsidiarv Question 5
What contracting methods/types/vehicles can be effectively
used to reduce PALT without sacrificing the benefits of reduced
spare parts prices and increased com.petition?
The answer to this question was addressed in Chapter V
and the previous section of this chapter. While a quantitative
analysis of the potential savings in PALT from the implementation
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of the recommendations enumerated above was beyond the scope
of this thesis, the researcher believes that even if only small
savings can be realized through the implementation of the
recommendations, there is potential for decreasing PALT by as
much as 47 days or more. This is based on a subjective
determination of 22 days saved through the earlier synopsis of the
intent to procure and an average saving of 25 days in the ordering
of technical drawings from NATSF as discussed in Recommendation
1. Additional savings might be realized through the installation of
a DSS, seeking redress on the UPO limitation, and using IDCs; the
specific time savings cannot be estimated since the research to
determine the degree of savings was beyond the scope of this
thesis
,
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research conducted for this study has revealed the following
areas for further study. Since the research was limited in scope
and methodology, these areas have potentially significant
implications for continued improvements to the procurement
process
:
1. Research tiie differences m PALT ior newiy competitive
items, previously competitive items, and sole source items
to determine the specific effects of CICA and UPO
initiatives.
2. Study the procurement process at ASO to determine the
potential savings in PALT from the implementation of
the initiatives recommended by the author of this thesis.
3. Study the feasibility of developing a "prototype" organiza-
tion within ASO consisting of Item Managers, Equipment
Specialists, and Procurement Analysts working together
in one area on a specific weapon system to determine
if PALT savings could accrue.
4. Research procurement leadtime of items awarded through
unpriced BOA orders and priced contracts to analyze and
compare PALT, production leadtime, procurement
leadtime, contract delivery date and actual delivery
date.
5. Research the specific responsibilities of Item Managers
and Procurement Analysts with respect to ALT, PLT,
and PCLT file data to determine what improvements
can be made to ensure that those people involved in
the process are responsive to factors such as RDD and
other inventory management elements.
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